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INTRODUCTION
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the
form and sufficiency of a statement of a claim under the liberalized
pleading rule.1 However, since the Federal Rules attempted to
adopt the successes and avoid the failures' of code pleading,' the
purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) seems to conflict with the purpose of
modern pleading.' Although the liberal pleading rule generally al-
lows a plaintiff to set forth a claim in a short and plain statement,
4
Rule 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss a complaint before the de-
velopment of the proceeding. The problem is when and how a Rule
12(b)(6) motion is to be granted. Although it has been said that a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion is rarely granted,5 the district court has
granted a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and the court of appeals has re-
versed or vacated that grant in a considerable number of cases.'
There are conflicting views on the interpretation of Rule 12(b)(6).
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
2. GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCE-
DURE, § 47, at 180 (1989).
3. It is said that only when the pleading fails to meet the liberal standard is
it subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1356, at 296 (2d Ed. 1990). How-
ever, the notice pleading theory does not need a 12(b)(6) motion. At first, Judge
Clark, a drafter of the Federal Rules, favored eliminating pleading motions alto-
gether. Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 85 YALE L. J. 914, 927-28 (1976).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 8 provides that a statement of a claim must be "simple,
concise and direct, as positive, precise, and succinct as possible." See also 4 CEPLA
aND PALMER, CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE, '§14.160, at 248 (3d ed. 1986).
Also, although Rule 9(b) provides that fraud must be pled with particularity, the
courts have held that Rule 9(b) must be applied concurrently with Rule 8. See,
e.g., In re Longhorn Securities Litigation, 573 F. Supp. 255, 263 (W.D. Okla.
1983).
5. THOMAS E. WILLGING, USE OF RULE 12(B)(6) IN Two FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS (Federal Judicial Center 1989).
6. Id. at 18.
1993]
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First, the effect of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not clear. For exam-
ple, it is not clear precisely what effect it has upon the application
of res judicata.7 Second, the standards and operation of Rule
12(b)(6) are not clear as to the determination of whether the mo-
tion should be granted or denied. In fact, commentators have ob-
served that the semantic slipperiness of both the Rule and Conley
v. Gibson8 facilitated the revival of fact pleading.' Even the objec-
tive of Rule 12(b) (6) is not clear. The well-established doctrine
has been, since Conley, that the objective of pleading is to give
"notice." At the same time, the objective of Rule 12 is to expedite
and simplify the pretrial procedures of federal litigation.10 Can no-
tice pleading allow the court to eliminate from consideration con-
tentions that have no legal significance?" Arguing that the answer
to this question is no, some commentators have suggested that the
notice pleading rationale be abandoned."
The Federal Rules and other statutes adopted various devices
which have diminished the functions of Rule 12(b)(6).1' Behind the
policy there is a basic precept that "the primary objective of the
law is to obtain a decision on the merits of any claim; and that a
case should be tried substantially on the merits rather than techni-
cally on the pleading."' 4 As actually occurs in many cases, the sal-
vaged minutes that may accrue from circumventing these proce-
dures can turn into wasted hours if the appellate court feels
constrained to reverse the dismissal of an action.'8
The conflict between liberalized pleading and these diminish-
ing factors has generated two contrary directions; an attempt to
use Rule 12(b)(6) more often, and an attempt to use Rule 12(b)(6)
less often. Although both contrary directions might be rejected at
the extremes, the problems they present remain to be resolved.
7. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1357, at 369.
8. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
9. David M. Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading and Standing, 65
CORNELL L. REV. 390, 419 (1980).
10. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1342, at 161.
11. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 5.2 at 239 (1985).
12. Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 492 (1986).
13. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment); 28 U.S.C.
1915(d)(1993)(allowing a court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action is
frivolous or malicious in a suit in forma pauperis).
14. Rennie & Laughlin, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 242 F.2d 208, 213 (9th Cir.
1957) (citing DeLoach v. Crowley's, Inc., 128 F.2d 378, 380 (5th Cir. 1942)).
15. See, e.g., Rennie & Laughlin Inc., 242 F.2d at 213.
[Vol. 15:119
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One direction may be viewed as an attempt to maximize the func-
tions of Rule 12(b)(6). This direction has sought to spur adoption
of tougher pleading standards mainly in response to a perception
of a litigation explosion in certain types of cases.1 6 If this position
prevails, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be used to dispose of an
increasing number of cases, and its function will be strengthened.
However, as some commentators suggest, the trend toward re-
turning to fact pleading cannot be sustained in view of the notice
theory of pleading. 17 Yet the fact remains that the content of mod-
ern pleading is questionable and, in addition, the language of the
1983 Amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requires
the pleading to show that it is "well grounded in fact.""8
The other direction may be viewed as an attempt to minimize
the function of Rule 12(b)(6). For example, Judge Clark advocated
the ambitious objective of equating Rule 12 to Rule 56 or abolish-
ing Rule 12 altogether.1 9 Recently, a proposal to abrogate the cur-
rent Rule 12(b) (6) motion appeared.20 The Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules considered the data in the Willging report at its
April 1989 meeting and declined to abrogate the current Rule
12(b)(6). 2 1
Should we view the Rule 12(b)(6) motion as an objectionable
practice? More fundamentally, are there any significant functions
of Rule 12(b)(6)? Although the current consensus is not clear,
many commentators seem only to have confirmed liberalized
pleading. Consequently, many commentators and courts appar-
16. See, e.g., Valley v. Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960-61 (D. Conn. 1968). See
also infra Part II-B-2.
17. See, e.g., Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Strin-
gent Pleading Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV.
935 (1990); Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation:
A Golden Anniversary View of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11
Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1023
(1989); Marcus, supra note 12; Roberts, supra note 9; C. Keith Wingate, A Spe-
cial Pleading Rule for Civil Rights Complaints: A Step Forward or A Step Back?,
49 Mo. L. REV. 677 (1984).
18. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, §3.13, at 163 (4th ed.
1992) and Wingate, supra note 17, at 690.
1 9. Smith, supra note 3, at 927.
20. In Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Reporter's Discussion Draft, Rule
12 (Oct. 1988), Professor Carrington expressed that the purpose of the abrogation
is to reduce the volume of motions practice that does not lead to termination of
the case, and such practice is said to have experienced a revival that is associated
with an increase in fact pleading. WILLGING, supra note 5, at 2.
21. WILLGING, supra note 5, at 3.
1993]
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ently have given up analyzing the practices of Rule 12(b)(6). In-
stead, they see summary judgment as the mechanism by which un-
meritorious cases should be disposed and Rule 11 as the device to
prevent "sham" claims.22 However, Rule 12(b)(6) may still have
important functions. In fact, Rule 12(b)(6) is apparently used more
than would be expected under the Conley standard.23 Under Rule
12(b)(6), a plaintiff may not only lose the opportunity to partici-
pate in discovery, but also lose the right to present affidavits and
reach the summary judgment stage if the complaint reveals an in-
adequate basis for the claim on its face.24
The purpose of this article is to clarify the function of Rule
12(b)(6) under liberalized pleading. To achieve this clarification,
this article examines the functions of Rule 12(b)(6) by using a cat-
egorization approach. Before entering the categorization, the previ-
ous controversies over the two opposing directions should be also
considered. Accordingly, the functions of Rule 12(b)(6) were
researched by reviewing several fundamental questions concerning
this obscure Rule. Under this theme, the following topics will be
discussed:
(1) the objectives of pleading and Rule 12(b)(6),
(2) the current standards (including the so-called stricter view
of pleading) and the desirable standards for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
under liberalized pleading,25
(3) the operation of Rule 12(b)(6), 2' and,
22. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.2, at 240-241 ("[T]he vast major-
ity of American courts now operate under a flexible pleading system that relies
heavily on other devices to aid in the delineation and control of litigation."). See
also Preston G. Sutherland, Fact Pleading v. Notice Pleading: The Eternal De-
bate, 22 LOYOLA L. REV. 47 69-70 (1976); DeLoach v. Crowley's, Inc., 128 F.2d 378,
380 (5th Cir. 1942) ("expensive trials of meritless claims are sought to be avoided
in the main by pretrial and summary judgment procedures").
23. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). See also infra notes 60-61 and ac-
companying text.
24. Jacob v. Curt, 898 F.2d 838, 839 (1st Cir. 1990).
25. The standards are applied at the final stage of Rule 12(b)(6) proceedings.
The same standards are applied in the determination of Rule 12(c) motions for
judgment on the pleadings. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 1581
(7th Cir.1991); 2A JAMES WM. MOORE & Jo DESHA LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE, 12.15, at 106 (2d ed. 1991); SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 2, § 50 at
200 n.29. Therefore, the scope of this article generally covers the determination on
the pleadings.
26. Although one important disposition of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is conver-
sion to a Rule 56 motion, the scope of this article is limited to pleading problems
and as such it will not deal with the conversion.
[Vol. 15:119
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(4) the effects of Rule 12(b)(6) decisions on res judicata,
amendment of the complaint, and appealability.
I. OBJECTIVES OF PLEADING AND RULE 12(B)(6)
A. Modern Pleading Structure
This chapter will briefly examine the objectives of modern
pleading and Rule 12(b)(6). The Rule 12(b)(6) motion addresses
itself solely to a failure to state a claim and is not designed to cor-
rect* inartistic pleading or to force compliance with the Federal
Rules.27 Under modern pleading, issue narrowing, fact develop-
ment and guidance, and screening of sham or insufficient claims or
defenses are accomplished by discovery, pretrial conference, other
screening motions, and other devices.28 Professor Moore empha-
sized in his treatise that pleading need do little more than indicate
generally the type of litigation.29 Under this concept, to give "no-
tice," in modern pleading, a plaintiff need only achieve two limited
and simple objectives: to identify the matter in dispute, and to ini-
tiate the process of its solution.30
Under the Federal Rules, a pleading may simply be a general
summary of the party's position which advises the other party and
the court of the event being sued upon and provides some guid-
ance l as to (i) what was decided for purposes of res judicata, (ii)
whether the case should be tried to the court or to a jury,32 and
(iii) which statute of limitation is applicable to the action.33 Also, a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion may allow the defendant to postpone the an-
27. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1356, at 296.
28. See, e.g., SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 2, § 47, at 180;
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.7, at 253; Blaze, supra note 17, at 942.
See also 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, §§ 1201-1202 (regarding historical
background); Sutherland, supra note 22, at 48-51; Fleming James, Jr., The Objec-
tive and Function of the Complaint/Common Law-Codes-Federal Rules, 14
VAND. L. REV. 899 (1961).
29. 2A MOORE & LUCAS, supra note 25, T 8.03, at 8-10.
30. Blaze, supra note 17, at 944.
31. A litigant cannot prepare for trial and the court cannot control an action
unless they know the nature of the parties' allegations. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL.,
supra note 11, § 5.2, at 239; JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, § 3.1, at 138.
32. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1202, at 69; 2A MOORE & LUCAS,
supra note 29, 8.13, at 8-61.
33. SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 2, §47[B], at 184. By commencing
the action, pleading operates to toll the statute of limitations. Blaze, supra note
17, at 944.
1993] 125
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swer to a complaint.3 4 These are important functions, but they do
not. seem to be essential because they do not tend to affect the
outcome of the dispute itself.
Labeling the objective of Rule 12(b)(6) as giving "notice" does
not resolve various problems regarding Rule 12(b)(6).15 Also, bare
"notice" of a claim is too scant, cloudy, or irrelevant. 6 While one
theory requires "full notice of all of factual particulars," another
theory requires general notice of the claim to put the adversary on
guard. It has been said that the pleading should be only a general
guide under the latter position, 8 but it is not clear what is meant
by "general guide." In any event, the statement must be "more
than a mere hint of a claim." 39
As a drafter of the Federal Rules has suggested, a plaintiff is
required to allege some factual details in order "to disclose ade-
quate information as the basis of his claim for relief as distin-
guished from a bare averment that he wants relief and is entitled
to it."'0 Mere emphasis of "notice" may encourage the defendant
to delay answering; because if the defendant answers, the question-
able complaint may be deemed to satisfy the notice requirement."'
Accordingly, if the defendant answers, he may lose the right to a
dismissal at the pleading stage. However, the defendant is allowed
to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings after a responsive
pleading.42 Accordingly, the pleading must have objectives other
34. See, e.g., Brown v. Crawford County, 960 F.2d 1002, 1010 (11th Cir. 1992)
(pointing out that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion preempts the necessity of a defendant's
filing an answer until the motion is decided by the district court).
35. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1202, at 72; ("At best it leads to
confusion . . . At worst it has caused unnecessary criticism of the rules . . . ");
Blaze, supra note 17, at 943 ("Standing alone the term 'notice' is imprecise. No-
tice of what, to whom, and most importantly, for what purpose?").
36. 4 CEPLA & PALMER, supra note 4, § 14.164, at 254.
37. Sutherland, supra note 22, at 48.
38. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 11, 5.2, at 240.
39. 4 CEPLA & PALMER, supra note 4, § 14.164, at 254.
40. Naglar v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 324 (2d Cir. 1957).
41. In denying a 12(b)(6) motion, courts have supported their decision with
the fact that the defendant was able to answer. See, e.g., In re Longhorn Securi-
ties Litigation, 573 F. Supp. 255, 264 (W.D. Okla. 1983)("[T]he complaints were
specific enough to permit the defendants to frame their responsive pleading; in-
deed, they have already answered.").
42. Technically, a post-answer Rule 12(b)(6) motion is untimely and some
other vehicle, such as a Rule 12 (c) motion, must be used to challenge the failure
to state a claim for relief. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1357, at 300-301.
However, since Rule 12(h)(2) provides that the defense of failure to state a claim
[Vol. 15:119
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than "notice."
Originally, the de-emphasis of pleading and the postponement
of fact development until after discovery had two important pur-
poses. One was to deny defendants the tactical use of the demur-
rer. 8 The notice theory was designed to eliminate needless battles
over form or technicalities which delayed a trial on the merits or in
some cases resulted in the loss of a meritorious claim." The other
purpose was to provide pleaders with a reasonable opportunity to
obtain proof of their allegations before confronting a challenge on
the merits.45 Thus, under simplified pleading, cases were expected
to "turn on their substantive merits rather than on the lawyers,
technical and tactical skills, as had been the case under the com-
mon law system."46
However, these purposes do not exclude other objectives, such
as eliminating narrowing issues concerning substantive law or suffi-
ciency of the complaint which would promote a resolution on the
merits, or disposing of an unmeritorious claim. Some limited and
fair requirements of pleading will not harm the purposes of liberal-
ized pleading. And, since the policy of the 1983 Amendment of
Rule 11 requires that the pleading be "well grounded in fact," Rule
11 might implicitly change the pleading rule. 7
Generally speaking, the pleading process allows "the elimina-
tion from consideration of contentions that have no legal signifi-
cance. 4 On the other hand, the purpose of a motion to dismiss "for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" is to test
the formality of a statement of a claim for relief, that is, the legal
may be granted may be advanced in a motion for judgment on the pleadings
under Rule 12 (c). The court may treat the motion after the answer as if it had
been styled a Rule 12 (c) motion. See, e.g., Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d
1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990).
43. Louis, supra note 17, at 1032.
44. See 2A Moore, supra note 25, 8.01, at 8-7.
The intent and effect of the rules is to permit the claim to be stated in
general terms; the rules are designed to discourage battles over mere
form of statement and to sweep away the needless controversies which
the codes permitted that served either to delay trial on the merits or to
prevent a party from having a trial because of mistakes in statement. Id.
(quoting Advisory Committee Report of October 1955).
45. Louis, supra note 17, at 1032.
46. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.1, at 237-238.
47. See infra part II-B-6.
48. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 12, § 5.2, at 239.
1993]
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sufficiency of the complaint." At the least, Rule 12 attempts "to
expedite and simplify the pretrial phase of federal litigation while
at the same time promoting the just disposition of cases." 50 Early
resolution on the merits is also an important objective of the Rule
12(b)(6) motion.51 In other words, Rule 12(b) (6) is viewed as one
of the basic pretrial interception/discouragement mechanisms in
the Federal Rules.2 Accordingly, the general purposes of pleading
and Rule 12(b)(6) are not only to give "notice," but also to resolve
or screen out some unmeritorious cases at the pleading stage.
The Federal Rules also adopted other means to accomplish
functions similar to that of Rule 12(b)(6). For example, Rule 12(c)
and 12(f) motions raise the same issues raised by a motion under
Rule 12(b)(6), 5' and are dealt with by the courts in the same man-
ner. An attempt to eliminate or strike improper or redundant mat-
ter from the complaint should be made under Rule 12(f). Also, if a
party wishes to attack a defense, he should move under Rule 12(f),
which provides for the striking of "any insufficient defense. ' 54 In
this regard, Rule 12(b)(6) does not work solely against plaintiffs,
but can work in conjunction with Rule 12(f) in favor of both par-
ties. Thus, the policy behind Rule 12(b)(6) may be sustained. Inso-
'far as the Federal Rules are designed to have Rule 12(b)(6) play an
important role, the standards for its operation should be effectively
and clearly articulated.
B. Balance of Interests
How can resolving certain cases at the pleading stage be justi-
fied? Rule 12(b)(6) is designed to test pure questions of law on the
face of the complaint. The rules aspire to "doing justice as well as
49. International Bank of Miami v. Banco de Economias y Prestamos, 55
F.R.D. 180, 185 (D.P.R. 1972).
50. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1342, at 161; Cf. SHREVE & RAVEN-
HANSEN, supra note 2, § 47, at 181.
51. Marcus, supra note 12, at 492.
52. Louis, supra note 17, at 1033.
53. Although 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) also seems to serve similar functions to
Rule 12(b)(6) , the Supreme Court has held that the standard of §1915(d) is
stricter than that of Rule 12(b)(6). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330
(1989)("A complaint filed in forma pauperis is not automatically frivolous within
the meaning of §1915(d) because it fails to state a claim.").
54. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1356, at 298 (citing FED. R. Civ. P.
12(f)).
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fair notice." 55 Although Rule 12(b)(6) motions may be intended to
do justice, the nature of this "justice" is not always clear. More-
over, if the court wishes to fully achieve this purpose, a "short and
plain statement" may be too short.
Although all proceedings should be conducted in light of Rule
1, the notice pleading theory and Rule 12(b)(6) are ultimately
designed to protect different interests. While notice theory allows
broader access to trial for a plaintiff, Rule 12(b)(6) is designed to
limit the use of civil procedure to protect judicial economy and de-
fendants' interests. Insofar as the court can decide the case on the
face of the complaint, pretrial disposition should be granted, be-
cause it may allow a speedier and less expensive resolution. On the
other hand, the parties should be given enough opportunity to pro-
ceed with their own claims. Accordingly, doing justice requires bal-
ancing between speedy and inexpensive decisions and an adequate
opportunity to present a claim.
From another point of view, "justice" can be broken down into
"substantive justice" and "procedural justice." In "substantive jus-
tice," we must look to substantive laws or policy, and in "proce-
dural justice," we must consider procedural laws or policy. Proce-
dural policy supports fair, speedy and inexpensive measures.56
Under this policy, the plaintiff must show good faith to seek legal
relief. In this regard, the applicable standard is suggested in Rule
8(a), which requires that a pleading contain a statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.57 There is some
question as to what Rule 8(a) requires. Even if the plaintiff is sub-
stantively entitled to a legal remedy, he may lose his right if he
misuses or abuses procedure, i.e. if he fails to comply with Rule
8(a) requirements.
Disputes raised by a plaintiff can be classified as follows:
(1) disputes in which the plaintiff is substantively entitled to a
legal claim, (2) disputes in which it is not clear whether the plain-
tiff is substantively entitled to a claim due to legal or factual ambi-
guity, and (3) disputes in which the plaintiff is not legally entitled
to any claim, but plaintiff sued because of an expectation for an
unjust settlement, a misunderstanding of substantive laws, or other
inappropriate reasons.
55. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 68, at 440 (1983).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
57. 27 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, L. ED., § 62:464 at 575 (THOMAS G. GOGER ed.,
1984).
1993]
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Even case (3) may not be dismissed under the modern notice
pleading, if the plaintiff stated a claim sufficiently in the com-
plaint. But if the statement of a claim was not sufficient, it is easy
to understand dismissal of such cases. On the other hand, under
modern civil procedure, cases (1) and (2) should not be dismissed
at the pleading stage in accordance with the liberalized pleading
concept. Yet, in some exceptional circumstances even cases (1) and
(2) may be dismissed when the plaintiff misuses or abuses the
procedures.
The standards for the operation of Rule 12(b)(6) must be ar-
ticulated so as to disfavor dismissal of cases (1) and (2),6" and to
favor dismissal of type (3) cases. The objectives of pleading and
Rule 12(b)(6) should include (i) eliminating some cases among (3),
and (ii) guaranteeing an opportunity to reach further proceedings
for certain cases in (1) and (2).
II. STANDARDS OF RULE 12(B)(6)
A. Modern Pleading Standards
In Conley v. Gibson,9 the Supreme Court stated that the
12(b) (6) motion must not be granted "unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief."60 Although many courts
have cited the Conley standard, which appears to preclude dismis-
sal in a close case, it is not clear whether a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is
properly granted or not in a close case. Some commentators sug-
gest several factors to be considered."' Relying upon these factors.
and the vague language in Conley, many courts and commentators
have proposed various standards too numerous to list.
The standard is further obscured by the lack of any attempt in
the Federal Rules to distinguish between "fact" and "legal conclu-
sion, '6 2 and the general philosophy of notice pleading rejecting as
58. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.8, at 255, present the question of
how the courts can prevent meritorious claims and defenses from being lost
through technical errors of procedure.
59. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
60. Id. at 45-6.
61. See, e.g., JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, § 3.9, at 153-154. Also, it should
be considered whether Rule 84 and Appendix of Forms correspond to the stan-
dard. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.7, at 254; WRIGHT, supra note 55,
§ 68, at 440; CEPLA & PALMER, supra note 4, §14.160, at 248.
62. See, e.g., JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, § 3.6, at 145.
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unworkable the distinction between "ultimate facts" and "legal
conclusions."68 Although facts can be supplemented by such rea-
sonable inferences as may be drawn in plaintiff's favor,64 the courts
have distinguished between required "fact" and insufficient "legal
conclusions" in deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions.6  This distinction
might be made against the interests of a plaintiff. Thus, it is not
clear what is required of well pleaded facts or allegations,66 and
how such reasonable inferences are drawn. As a result, modern
pleading and code pleading have been afflicted with similar
problems.6 I
The various and vague standards and the difficulty of distin-
guishing between required "fact" and insufficient "legal conclu-
sions" have caused great confusion and ambiguity in Rule 12(b)(6)
motion practice.6 8 The existing pleading standards are "too ambig-
uous to prevent a creeping revival of fact pleading as the favored
procedural device." 69 Even though the notice theory was a response
to the technical rigidity and procedural manipulation which fact
pleading had fostered,7 0 colorable standards seem to allow proce-
dural manipulation by lawyers.1 1 Although dilatory tactics were in-
63. WRIGHT, supra note 55, § 68, at 441.
64. See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972); SHREVE & RAVEN-HAN-
SEN, supra note 2, § 50, at 200; 2A MOORE & LUCAS, supra note 29, 12.07, at 12-
63; Sutherland, supra note 22, at 67.
65. In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, courts have said that they accept the truth
of "facts," "material facts," "well-pleaded facts," and "well-pleaded allegations,"
but they do not accept "legal conclusions," "footless conclusions of laws" or
"sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations." 5A WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 3, § 1357, at 311-318.
66. Some commentators contend that the distinction is not one between sep-
arate legal concepts; rather "the distinction is one between generality and particu-
larity in stating the transaction sued upon." 2A MOORE & LUCAS, supra note 29,
8.12, at 1684. However, generality and particularity cause different legal effects.
67. Marcus, supra note 12, at 438("Under the Field Code, there were real
problems with the codifier's reformation of pleading rules in that they invited
unresolvable disputes about whether certain assertions were allegations of ulti-
mate fact (proper), mere evidence (improper), or conclusion (improper).").
68. The modern pleading rule had generated great confusion as to alleging
the required "ultimate facts" while avoiding forbidden "conclusions" and "mere
evidence." Marcus, supra note 12, at 433.
69. Roberts, supra note 9, at 420.
70. Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts
for Minorities, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341 (1990).
71. For example, the fact manipulation of pleading principles might divert
the courts from formulating a comprehensive and workable approach to standing.
Roberts, supra note 9, at 436.
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tended to be eradicated by Rule 12,72 the ambiguous standards ap-
plied to 12(b)(6) motions have allowed some dilatory tactics.
Similarly, this ambiguous standard might prevent efficient applica-
tions of Rule 11 sanctions.73
Another problem, perhaps the most controversial, is the re-
quirement of particularized fact pleading in certain "disfavored"
actions. Several courts of appeals have made it clear that the same
liberal standard that applies in ordinary litigation should be appli-
cable to the so-called "big case."'7 Nevertheless, in certain "disfa-
vored" actions, many courts have tried to dispose of many cases,
including "big cases," by using different standards.7 6
Additionally, some courts of appeals have used standards dif-
ferent from the district courts' standards. For example, according
to Willging's research, 6 though a conceivable set of facts was al-
leged in support of each essential element in eight cases researched
1986 through 1988, the district courts granted Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tions. The courts of appeals reversed or vacated that grant in all
eight cases.7 7 Moreover, the Second and Third Circuits have ex-
72. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1342, at 163.
73. The current interpretations of the amended Rule 11 requirements may
conflict with the liberalized pleading requirement of the Federal Rules by de-
manding greater specificity of allegations and by discouraging the pleading of a
novel legal theory. Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L.
REV. 485, 493-95 (1988/89); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118
F.R.D. 189, 197-232 (1988); Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards For
Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARv. L. REV. 630 (1987).
74. See, e.g., Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 324 (2d Cir. 1957);
WRIGHT, supra note 55, § 68, at 446.
75. See, e.g., Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California
State Council of Carpenters, 495 U.S. 519, 529, n.17 (1987) (noting that a district
court must retain the power to insist upon some specificity in pleading before
allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to proceed). Some commenta-
tors view this decision as a shift toward more particularized pleading in antitrust
litigation. See, e.g., Edward Brunet and David J. Sweeney, Integrating Antitrust
Procedure and Substance After Northwest Wholesale Stationers: Evolving Anti-
trust Approaches to Pleadings, Burden of Proof, and Boycotts, 72 VA. L. REV.
1015, 107 (1986) ("The Supreme Court has yet to establish a general norm requir-
ing fact-specific antitrust pleading, but there is every indication of evolution to-
ward such a norm."). Brunet and Sweeney also point out that the Manual for
Complex Litigation, Second (1985) seems inconsistent with the spirit of notice
pleading. Id. at 1066-67.
76. WILLGING, supra note 6, at 18.
77. Id. Willging points out that these actions would represent a tendency on
the part of district courts to require fact pleadings and a tendency on the part of
circuit courts to resist that trend. Id.
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pressed an exception to normal federal pleading standards, and
this is recognized to varying degrees in most other circuits.78 It has
also been noted that in certain classes of cases a large segment of
the federal judiciary now systematically applies very strict plead-
ing standards which are at odds with the Conley standard and
Rule 8(a).79 Thus, the confusion about standards exists not only at
the district court level but also at the appellate court level. Accord-
ingly, the problem with the standard of Rule 12(b)(6) is how to
remove the ambiguity of the standard, how to resolve the fact-con-
clusion distinction problem, and how to deal with the stricter views
of pleading. In order to consider the first two questions, the
stricter views of pleading will be briefly examined next.
B. Stricter Views of Pleading
It has been said that the apparent revival of special fact plead-
ing requirements for disfavored actions suggests that 12(b)(6) mo-
tions may be effective in this significant subset of cases.80 Tradi-
tionally disfavored causes of action include malicious prosecution,
libel, and slander.8 1 Additionally, many commentators have noted
that civil rights cases, securities claims, conspiracy, and disfavored
litigants (the repeat player, the disfavored lawyer, the poor) are
subject to stricter standards.82 These strict pleading rules have
been criticized as a "revival of fact pleading,"83 and a number of
federal courts have refused to adopt a special pleading rule in civil
rights cases.8 4
78. See Roberts, supra note 9, at 418.
79. Id. at 419.
80. SHREE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 2, § 50, at 197.
81. In these cases some courts tend to construe the complaint by a somewhat
stricter standard and are more inclined to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dis-
miss. 5A WRIGHT & MMLER, supra note 3, § 1357, at 359.
82. In certain matters, the Federal Rules require special pleading. Also, in
other proceedings, some statutes necessitate fact pleading due to their own policy.
However, the commentators have roundly rejected the formalistic argument that
Rule 9(b) erects a special regime immune to the liberal pleading approach of Rule
8. Marcus, supra note 12, at 447. The courts have noted that Rule 9(b) requires
only that the "circumstances" of the fraud be set forth; it does not revive the
requirement that "fact" be pleaded. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 12, § 5.9, at
257.
83. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 12; Wingate, supra note 17; Blaze supra
note 17.
84. See, e.g., U.S. v. Gustin-Bacon Div., 426 F.2d 539, 542 (10th Cir. 1970);
Gobel v.Maricopa County, 867 F.2d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 1989); Elliott v. Bronson,
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Some courts have suggested that the stricter standard of
pleading was merely an application of the fair notice standard to
civil rights cases.15 For example, in United States v. City of Phila-
delphia,8 the Third Circuit stated "[t]he rule is well established in
this circuit that a civil rights complaint that relies on vague and
conclusory allegations does not provide 'fair notice', and will not
survive a motion to dismiss. '" ' Also, in Colburn v. Upper Darby
Township,"s the court stated "[tlhe heightened specificity require-
ment for § 1983 claims does not alter the general standard for rul-
ing on motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). ' 9
However, piecemeal modification itself has various problems
such as whether such strict pleadings are compatible with the
rules90 and in what kinds of cases? 91 Even Though pro se inmate
civil rights complaints seem to be less likely to prevail than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers, the Supreme Court held, in Haines
v. Kerner,92 that pro se inmate civil rights complaints are to be
measured against "less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers." 93 If pro se civil rights cases are to be judged
less stringently, it is illogical for a court to use stringent standards
in civil rights cases brought by lawyers simply because the claim is
not likely to prevail. Commentators have put forth several ratio-
nalizations supporting strict pleading. Each will be dealt with in
turn.
1. Reasons From Substantive Law or Policy
Although some substantive laws or policies might influence
procedural laws,94 procedural rules should not be changed without
modification of the procedural laws. For example, the Ninth Cir-
872 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1989).
85. Wingate, supra note 17, at 687.
86. 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980).
87. Id. at 204.
88. 838 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1988).
89. Id. at 666.
90. Piecemeal modification seems to violate the Federal Rules, which specifi-
cally adopt a few such special pleading requirements in Rule 9. and supposedly
govern the rest of pleading through the liberalized standard of Rule 8. See Louis,
supra note 17, at 1037.
91. Id. ("Such common-law implementation, however, would obviously be
controversial, random and uncertain.").
92. 404 U.S. 519, (1972).
93. Id., at 520,. Cf. infra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, § 3.9, at 154.
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cuit has adopted a special pleading rule in cases involving activity
arguably protected by the First Amendment.' 5 However, as Marcus
suggests, insistence on greater specificity in pleading to protect
general first amendment interests is misguided.96 Such interests
should be protected by legislative laws, not by judicial modification
of procedural laws, because issues relating to the First Amendment
and other serious policies often involve sensitive conflicts with
other interests. Since substantive law or policy is best addressed by
the legislature, not by the judiciary. Specificity or particularity of
pleading as a requirement for remedies should also be controlled
by the legislature. 7 The judiciary is not the appropriate branch to
decide to what degree a specific interest should be protected.
Some courts have suggested reasons that substantive laws may
change the pleading rules. For example, in Taylor v. Bear Stearns
& Co., 98 the court stated "there are many sound reasons for requir-
ing that, like fraud, [a claim under RICO] must be pled with par-
ticularity." 99 The court first reasoned that the mere invocation of
RICO has such an in terrorem effect that it would be unconsciona-
ble to allow it to linger in a suit and generate suspicion and unfa-
95. Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive
Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1083-85 (9th Cir. 1976). In this case, the
court stated that they would not adopt so-called "fact" pleading distinguished
from "notice" pleading, but it also stated, "the danger that the mere pendency of
the action will chill the exercise of First Amendment rights requires more specific
allegation than would otherwise be required." Id. However, the requirement of a
specific allegation amounts to "fact" pleading under modern pleading procedures.
96. Marcus, supra note 12, at 447.
97. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989)
("RICO may be a poorly drafted statute; but rewriting it is a job for Congress, if
it is so inclined, and not for this Court"). Cf. Wingate, supra note 18, at 692
("[Nleither the Advisory Committee, the Supreme Court, nor Congress concluded
that such [a strict] approach was required except in regard to allegations of fraud
or mistake.").
98. 572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
99. Id. at 682. RICO generally makes it unlawful for any person employed by,
or associated with, an enterprise to conduct or participate in the conduct of the
enterprise's affairs through "a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. §§1961-
1968 (1988). The statute defines a "pattern of racketeering activity" to be at least
two acts of racketeering activity within ten years of each other. Id. "Racketeering
activity," in turn, is defined to include offenses such as murder, kidnapping, gam-
bling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, drug dealing and obstruction of justice as
well as mail fraud, wire fraud and fraud in the sale of securities. Id. See generally
Marcus, supra note 12, at 460-462; Committee on Federal Courts of the New York
State Bar Association, The Pattern of Racketeering Element of RICO Liability, 6
TouRo L. REV. 281, 283-284 (1990).
19931
17
Hamabe: Functions of Rule 12(b)(6) in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedur
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1993
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
vorable opinions of the putative defendant unless there is some ar-
ticulable factual basis. 10 The court secondly reasoned that the
concepts within RICO are so nebulous that if the cause of action
were only generally pled, a defendant would have no effective no-
tice of a claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'01
Therefore, the court -concluded that a complaint alleging a RICO
violation, like a complaint alleging fraud, should be filed only after
a wrong is reasonably believed to have occurred, and that it is nec-
essary that either a prior conviction or probable cause be alleged
with reference to the predicate acts.' 2 However, if these justifica-
tions for particularity are valid, the court would be able to use the
stricter standards in many cases, because many civil disputes have
some in terrorem effect, and any substantive law includes some
nebulous areas. Since Rule 9(b) could be applied to allegations of
fraud in a RICO claim,'0 3 additional special requirements were not
necessary. Even a strict approach to pleading fraud under Rule 9
has been criticized because the particularity requirement inef-
ficiently serves its underlying purposes, it impedes the litigation of
legitimate claims, and it fails to comport with the policy and struc-
ture of the Federal Rules. 04
In alleging misstatement for fraud, fairly precise allegations
concerning the nature, time, place, manner and author of a mis-
statement are typically available to the plaintiff without need for
discovery and are usually not subject to the claim that it is pecu-
liarly within the defendant's knowledge.'05 However, in alleging the
elements for a RICO claim, a plaintiff may not be able to know the
facts adequately.'" Accordingly, it is not appropriate to require
more particularized allegations or other elements for a RICO claim.
In summary, the legislature was free to adopt special pleading
100. 572 F. Supp. at 682.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 682-683.
103. See, e.g., Graue Mill Dev. Corp. v. Colonial Bank & Trust Co. of Chi-
cago, 927 F.2d 988, 992 (7th Cir. 1991); Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas
Pipe Line Co., 873 F.2d 1357, 1362 (10th Cir. 1989); Randy M. Mastro et al.,
Private Plaintiff's Use of Equitable Remedies Under the RICO Statute: A Means
to Reform Corrupted Labor Unions, 24 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 571, 627-28 (1991).
104. Richard G. Himelrick, Pleading Securities Fraud, 43 MD. L. REV. 342,
345 (1984).
105. Id. at 353.
106. See, e.g., Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1439-40 (7th Cir. 1990) (dis-
missing a RICO complaint because it did not adequately allege an enterprise of
the defendants upon which the court's attention should be directed).
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rules under RICO and did not. The court thus does not have legiti-
mate reason to step in and impose a special pleading rule beyond
the Federal Rules.
The Supreme Court has taken the position that substantive
policy or law should not influence the pleading rules. For example,
in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,'0 7 the Supreme Court rejected
the Second Circuit's efforts to construct new elements for a RICO
claim.10 8 Similarly, in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.,109
the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the dismissal decision
of the court below by refusing to narrow the application of civil
RICO. 10 Also, in Haines v. Kerner,"' the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded a dismissal decision 1 2 because allegations such as
those asserted by the petitioner, however inartfully pleaded, were
sufficient to call for the opportunity to offer supporting evidence,
regardless of the disciplinary policy in prison. 1" 3
Therefore, unless there are specific pleading requirements con-
tained in the relevant statute or the Federal Rules," 4 the courts
should not impose special pleading rules. As Professor Marcus con-
cluded, the substantive law often simply does not support develop-
ment of the kind of separable issues that could be used to winnow
107. 473 U.S. 479, (1985).
108. Id. at 496. A violation of §1962(C) of RICO requires "(1) conduct (2) of
an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity." Id. The court
required the plaintiff to allege each of these elements to state a claim.
109. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
110. Id. at 249. See also, Committee on Federal Courts of the New York
State Bar Association, supra note 99, at 290-94.
111. 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam).
112. The district court had dismissed the claim because only under excep-
tional circumstances should courts inquire into the internal operations of state
penitentiaries, and the court of appeals affirmed by emphasizing that prison offi-
cials are vested with broad discretion in disciplinary matters. Id. at 521.
113. Id. at 520 ("Petitioner's pro se complaint included general allegations of
physical injuries suffered while in disciplinary confinement and denial of due pro-
cess in the steps leading to that confinement. The claimed physical suffering was
aggravation of a preexisting foot injury and a circulatory ailment caused by forc-
ing him to sleep on the floor of his cell with only blankets.").
114. E.g. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 also imposes special plead-
ing requirements on derivative actions but Rule 23.1 is procedural only, and does
not supply the substance of the demand requirement. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin
Serv., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1711, 1716 (1991); In re BankAmerica Securities Litigation,
636 F.Supp. 419, 421 (C.D. Cal. 1986)("[Tlhis sufficient particularity requirement
is consistent with the analysis employed by federal courts under the analogous
particularity requirements [of Rule 9(b)]").
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cases at the pleading stages. 15
2. Explosion of Litigation
The recent explosion of litigation in the United States tends
to encourage the stricter views of pleading procedure. Some com-
mentators point out that the movement toward stricter pleading
requirements started with the explosion of civil rights cases in the
1960s." 6 In Valley v. Maule,"7 the court cited the fact that there
were "an increasingly large volume of cases brought under the
Civil Rights Acts," to jusitfy an exceptional pleading rule for civil
rights cases." 8 However, the explosion of litigation is not an evil
phenomenon by itself. The real cause of civil rights actions may
very well have been problems in prison practices. In fact, in 1960,
there was concern about a decline in litigation." 9
Although the explosion might be a motive to restrict access to
courts, such a phenomenon cannot justify special pleading rules.120
The notice theory of pleading might cause an increase in the
amount of litigation.'2 ' However, objective evidence linking the ex-
plosion of litigation with notice pleading theory is problematic, be-
cause there are many other causes for increased litigation, such as
the increased number of lawyers and the introduction of new stat-
ues. In fact, some commentators believe that the cause of the vir-
tual explosion of civil RICO cases is substantive in nature - treble
damages, attorneys' fees shifting and other factors favoring pro-
spective plaintiffs. 22 Accordingly, whether notice pleading was the
main cause of the explosion of litigation is questionable.
3. Judicial Economy For Public Interests
Stricter views of pleading may serve the public interest by
preventing unnecessary litigation. 12 However, stricter views are
115. Marcus, supra note 12, at 462.
116. Blaze, supra note 17, at 935-937.
117. 297 F. Supp. 958 (D.Conn. 1968).
118. Id. at 960-61.
119. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know
and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and
Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 9 (1983).
120. See, e.g., Wingate, supra note 17, at 691.
121. Marcus, supra note 12, at 436, 450.
122. Committee on Federal Courts of the New York State Bar Association,
supra note 99, at 284.
123. Cf. JAMZs ET AL., supra note 18, §3.10, at 155.
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not always useful in achieving these goals. Some commentators
point oUt that efforts to use stricter views of pleading usually re-
sult only in a waste of time and much longer pleading, without any
corresponding gain. 2 In Nagler v. Admiral Corp.,25 Judge Clark
expressed "fears that fact-specific antitrust pleading would lead to
bulkier complaints and an unnecessary increase in pretrial motions
directed at pleading technicalities.
126
Also, administrative efficiency should not be bought at the
cost of substantive injustice to the individual.' 2' Rather, adminis-
trative efficiency should be achieved through legislative action. '28
Courts should be sensitive to public interests in judicial functions.
However, since the interests of the public may impact upon the
interests of plaintiffs as they are affected by pleading require-
ments, the balancing of these interests should be made by legisla-
tion, not by judicial modification of procedural laws.
4. Constitutional Limitations on Judicial Functions
Some limitations on the function of the judiciary lie in the
Constitution. For instance, Article III cryptically restricts the fed-
eral judicial power to "cases" and "controversies. '129 Now known
as the requirement of standing, this is the threshold question in
every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain
the suit. 30 After United States v. Student Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures,"' the court began to move away from the lib-
eral Conley rule in the pleading of standing.132 However, Roberts
124. WRIGHT, supra note 55, § 68, at 446.
125. 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957).
126. Brunet and Sweeney, supra note 75, at 1068 (citing Nagler, 248 F.2d at
322-27).
127. JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, § 3.10, at 155.
128. Id. ("The Federal Rules are designed to ensure wider opportunity to de-
velop a case by the adoption of general pleadings, and the contribution that de-
tailed pleadings can make toward administrative efficiency is limited.").
129. Roberts, supra note 9, at 392.
130. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1974) (stating that it is
within the court's powers to allow or to require the plaintiff to supply "further
particularized allegation of fact deemed supportive of plaintiff's standing" by
amendment to the complaint or affidavits).
131. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
132. James E. Brown, Note, Civil Procedure - Standing and Direct Review
in Appellate Court - Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 793 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1986)., 60 TEMP. L.Q. 1045, 1056-57
(1987). See also, Id. at 1059, ("The Supreme Court's opinions reveal that to estab-
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concluded that no pleading standard, fact or notice, can effectively
screen cases on standing grounds, because substantive standing
doctrine is too convoluted, emphasizing ambiguous concepts whose
resolution requires a fully developed evidentiary record. 183 Rather,
the court is responsible for the resolution of civil disputes on the
merits, and it is desirable to open the forum as much as possible.
This was the original policy of modern pleading.
5. Quick Resolution in the Interests of Defendants
The judiciary may use more stringent pleading rules to pre-
vent strike suits and protect the interests of defendants."" Cer-
tainly, the court may favor a policy of preventing strike suits. For
instance, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,13 5 the Supreme
Court pointed out that the risk of strike suits is particularly high
in cases that are difficult to prove at trial, and thus, are even more
difficult to dispose of before trial.136 In another example of a court
acknowledging the possibility of a groundless "strike suit," the
Second Circuit observed that, in the context of securities litigation,
Rule 9(b) "operates to diminish the possibility that a plaintiff with
a largely groundless claim [will be able] to simply take up the time
of a number of other people [by extensive discovery], with the
right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settle-
ment value, rather than a reasonably founded hope that the pro-
cess will reveal relevant evidence. "137
However, stricter views of pleading are not necessarily appro-
priate ways to protect defendants' interests. Instead, the resolution
might better be achieved through a clearer Rule 12(b)(6) standard.
Although there may exist "an important public policy to weed out
the frivolous and insubstantial cases at an early stage in the litiga-
tion,"138 screening securities or civil rights cases by means of strict
pleading rules is difficult.
lish standing under Article III, a plaintiff must make factual allegations sufficient
to establish injury in fact, causation, and redressibility.").
133. Roberts, supra note 9, at 430.
134. See, e.g., JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, § 3.6, at 148-49.
135. 421 U.S. 723, (1975).
136. Id. at 740-41. See also Marcus, supra note 12, at 443, 479.
137. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1979).
138. Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976)(citing
Valley v. Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960 (D. Conn. 1968).
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6. Rule 11
The language of the 1983 Amendment of Rule 11 requires the
pleading to be well grounded in fact."3 9 Rule 11 may be a good
reason to support the stricter view of pleading rather than "notice"
pleading, or it may facilitate the revival of fact pleading. The Advi-
sory Committee's 1955 Report states:
[T]hat Rule 8(a) envisages the statement of circumstances, occur-
rences, and events in support of the claim presented is clearly in-
dicated not only by the form appended to the rules showing what
should be considered as sufficient compliance with the rule, but
also by other intermeshing rules; see, inter alia, Rules 8(c) and
(e), 9(b)-(g), 10(b), 12(b)(6), 12(h), 15(c), 20, and 54(b).1 40
If the amended Rule 11 had existed at the time of the report, it
would have been added to this list of intermeshing rules, because
Rule 11 became an intermeshing rule by the term "well grounded
in fact," and Rule 8(e)(2) provides that all statements shall be
made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
Some courts have reasoned that Rule 11 was not intended to
not change the liberal notice pleading of the federal rules or the
requirements of Rule 8 because the Advisory Committee Note
specifies that the rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthu-
siasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories.14 1 How-
ever, whether the pleading rule is inappropriately chilling depends
on how the pleading rule is interpreted. Courts have suggested dif-
ferent interpretations to ameliorate the possibility of chilling an
attorney's creativity.14
139. See, e.g., JAMEs ET AL., supra note 18, § 3.13, at 162-68; Wingate, supra
note 17, at 690.
140. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1201, at 67 n. 11. This list does not
include Rule 11 because the original text of Rule 11 was not directly connected
with pleading rules and eliminated any requirement that pleadings be verified. Id.
§1331 at 110.
141. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1561 (11th Cir. 1987).
142. See, e.g., Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 667 (3d Cir.
1988) (noting that Rule 11 equated the signature of an attorney or party signing a
pleading with a certificate that the pleading "is well grounded in fact," and re-
quires plaintiffs to make "some prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the law to
satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the law")(citing Rule 11 Advisory Com-
mittee's Note concerning 1983 Amendment). However, court also cautioned that
one of the circumstances to be considered is whether the plaintiff is in a position
to know or acquire the relevant factual details. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803
F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986)(stating that the amended Rule 11 requires "more
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Some courts and commentators argue that notice pleading is
replaced by fact pleading with the enactment of amended Rule 11,
because a filing attorney's protection from sanctions depends upon
the facts derived from specific prefiling investigation and re-
search.14 However, whether plaintiff must state all related facts in
the complaint, at what stage plaintiff must complete investigation
and research, and whether Rule 11 standards are the same as Rule
12(b)(6) standards are unanswered questions.14' Rule 8 still re-
quires only that a plaintiff state a claim in simple and concise alle-
gations, and a plaintiff must still be given a fair opportunity of
discovery. Rule 11 was amended to address the various problems
with which the federal courts were faced, 45 but the basic concept
of liberal pleading was not changed.
Though the amended Rule 11 may not support the stricter
views of pleading, it is clearly inconsistent with a literal interpreta-
careful investigation and consideration of claims before including them in a com-
plaint, such boilerplate allegations are not only improper, but subject to an appro-
priate sanction").
143. See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083
(7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 901 (1988) (the amended Rule 11 was to
"add the requirement of adequate information before filing a complaint [so that]
it is not permissible to file suit and use discovery as the sole means of finding out
whether you have a case"); Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 692 (5th Cir. 1986); 5A
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1332, at 35-38; Jay S. Goodman, On the Fifti-
eth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: What Did the Drafters
Intend?, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 351, 365 (1987). See also Johnson v. United
States, 788 F.2d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1986)(Pratt, J., dissenting). Judge Pratt sug-
gested in his dissent that using Rule 11 to effect reversion to detailed fact plead-
ing requirements undermines both the language of the Federal Rules and the ba-
sic policy of notice pleading. Id. Cf. supra note 73 (various criticisms of Rule 11
collected).
144. Rule 11 standards are also unclear and ambiguous. 5A WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 3, § 1332, at 24-27. See also, Westlake North Property Own-
ers v. Thousand Oaks, 915 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1990)(noting that the stan-
dard for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and the standard for imposing sanctions
pursuant to Rule 11 are not the same, and that claims which are insufficient to
withstand a motion to dismiss may not warrant Rule 11 sanctions).
145. Before drafting the 1983 amendment, the Advisory Committee consid-
ered four factors: (1)the economic incentives to litigate, (2)the growth of federal
substantive rights, (3)the proliferation of lawyers, and (4)the easy access to the
federal courts in the procedural system established by the Federal Rules. 5A
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1331, at 13. (citing ARTHUR MILLER, THE Au-
GUST 1983 AMENDMENTS to tHE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURES: PROMOTING
EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT aND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 2-11 (Federal Judicial
Center 1984)).
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tion of the Conley standard, or the restricted use of Rule 12(b)(6).
Instead, the Federal Rules may suggest the flexible use of Rule
12(b)(6) with an appropriate balance between liberal pleading and
the necessity of being well-grounded in fact.
C. Categorization of Rule 12(b)(6) Motion Cases
1. Bases of Categorization
Since Rule 12(b)(6) is used in various situations, it is difficult
to set out an overarching and clear standard for assessing a
12(b)(6) motion."" Different issues may sometimes require differ-
ent standards, and the standard may differ depending on the con-
text. For example, there are various reasons why a plaintiff may
state a claim in an other than particularized fashion. It is reasona-
ble to establish the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in light of
the major reasons behind the plaintiffs, claim.
Rule 12(b)(6) motions question the specificity of the allega-
tions or the legality of the claim. Some commentators clarify that
the specificity becomes an issue in factual allegations of plead-
ing. 47 However, no satisfactory test of general application could be
formulated to mark the degree of specificity required in plead-
ing. 48 Also, it is not clear how legal questions are treated in Rule
12(b)(6) proceedings. Categorization may help to elucidate the de-
gree of specificity required. Thus, it is worth separately examining
how legal questions are treated and how factual allegations are
tested. Moreover, categorization is desirable, and even necessary,
to clarify related issues of dismissal sua sponte,149 res judicata ef-
fects, 150 and leave to amend.1 51
However, it is not appropriate to distinguish between pro se
complaints and complaints drafted by lawyers. Some courts and
commentators observe that courts must construe a pro se com-
plaint liberally, by applying less stringent standards than when a
146. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.7, at 254. ("No words are fully
adequate to describe with precision the balance between simplicity and detail.").
147. The basic test is "whether the complaint, with all the well-pleaded ma-
terial facts taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
set forth facts sufficient to state a legal claim." 27 GOGER ET AL., supra note 57,
§ 62.468, at 578.
148. JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, § 3.9, at 153.
149. See infra part III-C.
150. See infra part IV-A.
151. See infra part IV-B.
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plaintiff is represented by counsel. 52 Although this proposition
may be generous to plaintiffs who do not want to use a lawyer, why
such a generosity is necessary is not clear. Originally, both classes
of complaints must be treated equally under the liberal pleading
rule. The courts should not discourage plaintiffs from using law-
yers, because that may cause undesirable confusion in courts. Ac-
cordingly, the rule for pro se complaints should be interpreted to
mean that if the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a
valid claim on which plaintiff may prevail, it should do so despite
technical deficiencies such as failure to cite proper legal authorities
and confusion of various legal theories."5 3
2. Possibility of Categorization
A "statement of a claim" must include legal and factual state-
ments. Consequently, two issues arise in assessing every claim; an
issue of legal statement and an issue of factual statement. The
Federal Rules abandoned any attempt to distinguish between fac-
tual and legal statements. However, the two issues involving Rule
12(b)(6) on the face of a complaint can be distinguished. Since the
plaintiff must have "some substantive legal theory" and "informa-
tion about the facts going beyond pure conjecture," 154 we should
consider separately the legal and factual issues.
One may argue that the Federal Rules do not require some
substantive legal theory and information about the facts going be-
yond pure conjecture as did code fact pleading. A plaintiff can ob-
tain facts by means of discovery, and discovery ensues after the
complaint has been filed. 155 Thus, the Rules require of the pleading
that there be "reason to believe that, upon evidence which may be
disclosed by discovery, the pleader may be entitled to relief."1 56
Standing alone Rule 12(b)(6) does not seem to call for separate
factual and legal averments.
However, according to the Advisory Committee's 1955 Report,
although Rule 12(b)(6) does away with the confusion resulting
from attempting to distinguish between fact and cause of action, it
requires the pleader to disclose adequate information as to the ba-
152. 4 CEPLA & PALMER, supra note 4, §14.152, at 236. (citing Haines v. Ker-
ner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)).
153. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
154. JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, § 3.6, at 147.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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sis of his claim for relief as distinguished from a "bare averment"
that he wants relief and is entitled to it.1 5' Therefore, the Federal
Rules should be interpreted to require the plaintiff to have both
"some substantive legal theory" and "information about the facts
going beyond pure conjecture." 58 Thus, legal issues and those of
"fact" are appropriately examined separately.
3. Method of Categorization
Each lawsuit involves unique problems. It is possible to cate-
gorize cases according to problems appearing on the face of a com-
plaint. For example, the pleader may fail to state a claim with suf-
ficient clarity and in such detail as to cause an issue to arise at the
pleading stage of whether she has a legally valid claim on facts she
supposes to be true. In other words, if a claim can be stated more
specifically by the plaintiff, the complaint may be dismissed for
insufficiency of the allegations. In such cases, the court will decide
the Rule 12(b)(6) motion on the legal question. 16 9 However, plain-
tiffs do not have to plead with clarity and detail, as long as they
pose valid legal questions. While lawyers may be inclined toward
overpleading due to the threat of a malpractice suit,16 0 plaintiffs
may also have an incentive to plead vaguely in hopes that discov-
ery will turn up material on which to base a more specific
charge."6' In such cases, pleaders may not evade the requirements
of pleading by merely alleging bare legal conclusions1 62 or other in-
sufficient statements.
Finally, the court may dismiss a complaint on the basis of the
insufficiency or informality of a statement of a claim in some con-
texts.""3 Such a claim states either an erroneous legal theory or no
157. 5A WRIGHT & MLLER, supra note 3, § 1201, at 67 n.11.
158. JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, § 3.6, at 147.
159. Id. at 148.
160. Id. at 146. Although a plaintiff seems to be allowed to state facts in a
general manner, it is risky for a plaintiff to rely on this liberality. The inclusion of
superfluous claims would generally be harmless. Id.
161. Marcus, supra note 13, at 445.
162. Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)
("[I]f the facts 'do not at least outline or adumbrate' a violation of the Sherman
Act, the plaintiffs 'will get nowhere merely by dressing them up in the language of
antitrust.' ") (quoting Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir.
1984)).
163. A pleading setting forth a claim for relief should not be dismissed for
insufficiency or informality of the statement except where it appears to be a cer-
tainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts
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legal theory at all. Willging characterizes factual allegations as ei-
ther absent, conclusory, highly improbable, or conceivable. 64 By
dividing Rule 12(b)(6) motions into motions based on legal and
factual deficiences, and subdividing the factual deficiency cases us-
ing Willging's categories, Rule 12(6)(b) motions can be categorized
as follows:
A. No legal theory whatsoever based upon well-settled rules (friv-
olous case) (hereinafter referred to as "A context");
B. Questionable legal ground to establish a claim (substantive law
question) ("B context");
C. No factual allegation of an essential element of an established
legal theory ("C context");
D. Conclusory or general allegation of an essential element of an
established legal theory ("D context");
E. Highly improbable factual allegation of an essential element of
an established legal theory ("E context");
F. Conceivable set of facts alleged in support of essential ele-
ments establishing legal grounds ("F context"); and
G. Excessive or other defective form of pleading" 5 (G context").
It has been said that Rule 12(b)(6) was limited primarily to
substantive defects, and performed virtually no factual intercep-
tion function. 6 However, if "factual interception" includes a
problem of specificity or sufficiency of presented facts in the com-
plaint, Rule 12(b)(6) can perform a factual interception function.
Substantive interception corresponds to A and B contexts, and fac-
tual interception corresponds to C, D, E, and F contexts. The con-
text in which certain standards shall be applied has not been made
clear by the courts.167 The appropriate standards for application of
which could be proved thereunder. 4 CEPLA & PALMER, supra note 4, §14.154, at
238. However, this standard does not explain how the courts should define
"certainty."
164. WILLGING, supra note 5, at 16.
165. Modern pleading requires no "technical forms of pleading." SHREVE &
RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 2, § 47[C], at 185. However, under the federal rules,
the defects of form that can be challenged are that the complaint is unintelligible
or that it contains "result, immaterial, [or] impertinent" matter. A Rule 12(f) mo-
tion may be the correct vehicle, but a Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be equally
effective because Rule 8(e)(1) abolished technical forms of motions. Id. § 50, at
200.
166. Louis, supia note 17, at 1033.
167. For example, "dismissal is proper if the complaint lacks an allegation
regarding a required element necessary to obtain relief or if the plaintiff fails to
properly allege standing .... [or] if an affirmative defense or other bar to relief is
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Rule 12(b)(6) in each context will be examined in turn.
4. Summary of Contexts of Categorization
In the A context, no doubt exist that the complaint should be
dismissed because the statement can establish no claim at all. For
example, it is said, "a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to be
granted only in the unusual case in which plaintiff includes allega-
tions that show on the face of the complaint that there is some
insuperable bar to relief ... The complaint also is subject to dis-
missal under Rule 12(b)(6) when its allegations indicate the exis-
tence of an affirmative defense, but the defense clearly must ap-
pear on the face of the pleading."'168 This standard appears to be
applied only in the A context.
In the B context, the courts will usually not have a procedural
problem but a substantive law problem. Courts assessing com-
plaints in the B context will dismiss the complaint if it appears
that plaintiff cannot establish his claim as a matter of substantive
law."'9 However, the courts must carefully consider not only all
conceivable legal theories, but also the sufficiency of the allegations
in the F context in the same case.170
In the C context, 7 1 . as in the A context, there is no doubt the
complaint should be"dismissed because the statement cannot sup-
apparent from the face of the complaint, such as the official immunity of a de-
fendant, or the statute of limitation." 2A MOORE & LUCAS, supra note 25, 1 12.07
at 69. Although "a required element" is not clear, it may cover every context.
Although the "standing" doctrine is not clear, it may show up in the B or F con-
text. Other commentators do not refer to the standing doctrine to set out the
general standard. On the contrary, Roberts concluded that no pleading standard,
fact or notice, can effectively screen cases on standing grounds. Roberts, supra
note 9, at 430. Moreover, affirmative defense or other bar,, appears to be applied
in the A context. As this example illustrates, previous standards which did not
pay attention to context might not work well in actual cases. In this regard, it
may be possible to articulate clearer. standards if the context is considered.
168. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1357, at 352.
169. See infra part II-D-1.
170. See, e.g., Jackam v. Hospital Corp. of Am. Mideast, 800 F.2d 1577 (11th
Cir. 1986). The district court had dismissed the case because the claims were dis-
posed of only in the B context. However, the Eleventh Circuit found a conceivable
set of facts on the same legal theory in the F context, and another legal theory in
the B context.
171. According to Willging's report, 24% of the 42 claims in 38 circuit deci-
sions involving Rule 12(b)(6) between 1986 and 1988 were classified in the c con-
text. WILLGING, supra note 5, at 17.
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port any legal ground to establish a claim. C context cases are dis-
missed based on a technical or procedural reason. When a plaintiff
does not have a legal theory, the complaint may be dismissed be-
cause neither legal grounds nor facts are alleged. 72 Also, a plaintiff
may fail to state an essential element of a claim by stating a legal
conclusion only. 73 In the C context, since the complaint literally
does not include any facts to support a claim at all, it can be auto-
matically dismissed, unless it contains a question from another
context. However, in the C context, as in the D, E and F contexts,
a plaintiff may be substantively entitled to a claim; or it may be
unclear whether the plaintiff is entitled to a claim, due to legal or
factual ambiguity.
In the D context, mere conclusory or general allegations are
insufficient and not taken as true, because a claim cannot be stated
in the form of a legal conclusion, and because mere conclusions do
not provide enough information to enable the adverse party to pre-
pare his or her defense; nor do they sufficiently inform the court so
that it can determine the questions sought to be presented. 74
However, in the D context, the court should not dismiss a claim
solely because the statement of a claim includes general or con-
clusory allegations. 75 In this context it is important to examine the
content of essential elements and which party has the burden of
proof, rather than at the degree of specificity required.
In the E context, a claim containing a highly improbable fac-
tual allegation of an essential element of an established legal the-
172. See, e.g., Ochoa Realty Corp. v. Faria, 815 F.2d 812, 814 (1st Cir. 1987)
(affirming the dismissal in an expropriation case because no facts and no legal
grounds were alleged).
173. See, e.g., Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir. 1988)
(dismissing the claim for a violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection
Act because there was no allegation of the essential elements that defendant had
actual knowledge that a site was contaminated and engaged in a coverup).
174. 4 CEPLA & PALMER, supra note 4, §14.178, at 271.
175. See, e.g., Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 435 F.2d 267,
270 (7th Cir. 1970). A pleader's abstract assertion that one or another constitu-
tional right has been violated does not require the court to decide that a claim
had been adequately stated. Id. However, in this case, the court denied the mo-
tion to dismiss, because the averments concerning the operation of the patronage
system and the disadvantage to candidates and voters who attempted to use the
election process to change the direction of government were factual and gave ade-
quate and fair notice of the claim asserted. Id. See also Revene v. Charles County
Comm'r, 882 F.2d 870, 873-74 (4th Cir. 1989) (observing that conclusory allega-
tions that were supported by pleaded facts should survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
even if actual assertions are equally consistent with contrary conclusion).
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ory should also be dismissed for insufficiency. Willging's report did
not classify any case in this category.176 Plaintiffs tend to resort to
a highly improbable factual allegation of an essential element on
established legal theory in only a few unusual cases. However, as
one court put it, "the issue is not whether a plaintiff will ulti-
mately prevail,... Indeed it may appear on the face of the plead-
ings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely, but that is not the
test. ' 177 Accordingly, the court should not evaluate the probability
of the success of the claim, but should question "whether the
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim. 'i 78
When a plaintiff has resorted to highly improbable allegations
without any reasonable grounds, he is not entitled to offer evidence
to support the claim, and dismissal will be appropriate.
In the F context, if the complaint contains a conceivable set of
facts alleged in support of essential elements establishing legal
grounds, the claim shall not be dismissed. Dioguardi v. Durning1 7 9
is offered by Willging as an exampleof a case in the F context."'
The complaint revealed the basic nature of plaintiff's dispute with
defendant and the specific incidents upon which the complaint was
based.1 81 A motion to dismiss may be granted only if it is clear that
plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under "any reasonably con-
ceivable set of facts which might be proven in a trial on the mer-
its." 2 Accordingly, the issue will be whether a statement includes
a reasonably conceivable set of facts.
In the G context, the complaint may be dismissed by opera-
tion of Rule 12(b)(6).1 83 For example, in Hartz v. Friedman,184 the
176. WILLGING, supra note 5, at 17.
177. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
178. 128 Id.
179. 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
180. The plaintiff did not prove his claim finally at trial because the defend-
ant had an affirmative defense. Dioguardi v. Durning, 151 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1945).
However, the complaint stated a conceivable set of facts which would establish a
claim, if he could have proved the facts and the defendant did not have any af-
firmative defenses.
181. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.8, at 254. Justice Clark stated,
"however inartistically they may be stated, the plaintiff has disclosed his claim."
Dioguardi, 139 F.2d at 775.
182. See, e.g., R.I.T.A. Chem. Corp. v. Malmstrom Chem. Corp., 200 F. Supp.
954, 955 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
183. See supra note 165 (dismissal of complaint that includes impertinent
matter is proper under 12(b)(6)).
184. 919 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1990).
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court stated that a complaint of 125 pages (323 paragraphs) was an
egregious violation of the procedural requirement that complaint
set forth a short and plain statement of a claim.188 Generally, re-
peated refusals by plaintiff to conform to the dictates of Rule 8
and Rule 10 as to the proper form or content of the pleading may
also result in a dismissal for failure to state a claim.186 However,
the courts should use this approach sparingly. Although some
courts may be impatient with long complaints,187 the courts should
be reluctant to dispose of the complaint on technical grounds, in
view of the liberal pleading policy of determining actions on their
merits.188 In order to avoid the G context approach, the court,
when possible, should use another context to dispose of appropri-
ate cases. For example, in Hartz v. Friedman,89 despite the defec-
tiveness of the form of the complaint, the court treated the com-
plaint on its merits, because the district court chose to do so, and
because doing so would dispose of the claim. 90 Nevertheless, in
Prezzi v. Schelter,'9' the court held that final dismissal was appro-
priate where an 88-page complaint was "a labyrinthian proximity
of unrelated and vituperative charges that defied comprehension,"
and the amended complaint was "equally prolix and for the most
part incomprehensible.' 9 2
185. Id. at 471. A court has also granted a 12(b)(6) motion when the com-
plaint exceeded 70 pages in length. Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409 (9th
Cir. 1985).
186. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1356, at 296-298; 4 CEPLA &
PALMER supra note, §14.166, at 257.
187. See, e.g., Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 41 (2d Cir. 1988). The dis-
trict court had stated that a claim naming at least 22 defendants, setting forth 23
causes of action, numbering 15 pages and 88 paragraphs was clearly in violation of
Rule 8 and may be dismissed for that reason alone. Although the Second Circuit
modified to permit the plaintiff to file an amended complaint, it affirmed the or-
der dismissing the complaint. Id. at 43.
188. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3 of Introduction,§ 1357, at 323-24.
189. 919 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1990).
190. Id. at 471, citing Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1436 (7th Cir. 1990).
In Jennings, the court dismissed the case, not because the complaint was 55 pages
long, containing 433 rhetorical paragraphs that were "prolix, disjointed, confusing,
and at times unintelligible," but because the complaint did not adequately allege
an enterprise which was required for a RICO claim. Id. at 1435, 1438-40.
191. 469 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1972).
192. Id. at 692. See also Gordon v. Green, 602 F.2d 743, 745-47 (5th Cir.
1979) (ruling that a 4000-page pleading should have been dismissed for lack of
compliance with Rule 8, but that leave to file an amended complaint should be
granted).
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One claim may involve various contexts. Therefore, categories
may often overlap in one case.'9" Without articulating that they
were doing so, some judges have already used a categorization ap-
proach in analyzing Rule 12(b)(6) cases.19 4 The value of categoriza-
tion is to allow distinguishment between several potential flaws
present in complaints thereby defining a clearer standard for as-
sessing complaints. Having considered some of the problems and
suggestions for their resolution in these matters generally, the dis-
cussion now turns to more specific points, beginning with the B
context.
D. Substantive Interception
1. Reasonable Standard
A complaint should not be dismissed merely because plaintiff's
allegations do not support the legal theory she intends to pursue,
and it need not appear that plaintiff can obtain the particular re-
lief prayed for, as long as the court can ascertain that some relief
may be granted.' 5 This corresponds to the Conley standard and
the liberal pleading alllowed in the B context. In other words, a
court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could
be granted under "any set of facts that could be proved consistent
with the allegations. "196
However, the courts do not accept "legal conclusions," "un-
supported conclusions," "unwarranted inferences," "unwarranted
deductions," "footless conclusions of law" or "sweeping legal con-
193. See WILLGING, supra note 5, at 161. ("While the categories are not mu-
tually exclusive, within the fact and law sides they can be applied exclusively.").
See also infra part II-D-4.
194. See, e.g., California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508 (1972). Justice Stewart's concurring opinion would have dismissed the case in
the B context, because a conspiracy by railroads to influence legislative and exec-
utive action in order to destroy the competition of truckers in the longhaul freight
business was wholly immune from antitrust laws. Id. at 516. However, he denied
the dismissal in the F context, because the plaintiffs were entitled to a chance to
prove that the real intent of the conspirators was not to invoke the processes of
administrative agencies and courts, but to discourage and ultimately to prevent
the plaintiffs from invoking those processes, according to the natures of the alle-
gation. Id. at 518.
195. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1357, at 336-339. See, e.g., Doe v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("It need not
appear that the plaintiff can obtain the specific relief requested as long as the
court can ascertain from the complaint that some relief can be granted.").
196. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, (1984).
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clusions cast in the form of factual allegations. ' 197 For example,
"standing, ripeness, subject matter jurisdiction and failure to in-
vestigate are legal conclusions."19 These legal issues are tested by
Rule 12(b)(6). On this proposition, the court will be responsible for
its legal decision on these issues as follows.
First, if the court concludes at the pleading stage that a claim
cannot be legally sustained, it is clear that a different legal conclu-
sion will not be reached after additional proceedings. Since the
court does not have to accept legal conclusions in the complaint as
true in considering the complaint's sufficiency, the judge may and
must consider whether its conclusions can be legally sustained. If
the judge concludes that a claim is substantively defective, it will
become a waste of time to continue the proceedings, whether or
not the conclusion is correct.
Second, since Rule 12(b)(6) may test a matter of law, the court,
may have the duty to examine the legal theories for a claim in dis-
posing of a motion to dismiss; unlike in a motion to strike by de-
fendants, which the district court may dispose of with broad dis-
cretion.199 In dismissing the claim in the B context, the court does
not have to consider questions of fact, but concentrates on unclear
and disputed questions of law. Accordingly, unlike the motion to
strike by defendants, 00 the motion to dismiss can be flexible.
Third, the district court's decision at an early stage will facili-
tate an early appellate review. Therefore, even plaintiffs may bene-
fit by receiving early appellate review. If the trial court eliminates
a claim on the basis of a novel legal theory, or on one that previ-
ously had been rejected but that now, in light of technical or social
developments, has substantial appeal, the appellate court may gen-
erate a new legal theory faster than the court in full trial pro-
cess.201 In this regard, fact pleading might have the advantage of
197. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1357, at 311-318.
198. See, e.g., United States v. Air Florida, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 17, 20 (S.D.
Fla. 1982) (granting the motion to dismiss for insufficient conclusory allegation).
199. See, e.g., United States v Union Gas Co., 743 F. Supp. 1144, 1150 (E.D.
Pa. 1990) ("If there are either questions of fact or disputed questions of law, the
motion to strike must be denied. For the plaintiff to succeed on this motion, the
court must be convinced that there are no questions of fact, that any questions of
law are clear and not in dispute, and that under no set of circumstances could the
defenses succeed.")(citing Smith, Kline & French Lab. v. A.H. Robins Co., 61
F.R.D. 24, 34 (E.D. Pa. 1973)).
200. However, in the B context, a motion to strike for insufficiency by plain-
tiffs will have the same functions as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by defendants.
201. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.2, at 239.
152 [Vol. 15:119
34
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol15/iss2/1
FUNCTIONS OF RULE 12(B)(6)
facilitating early appellate reviews of legal questions and avoiding
useless investment of energy litigating on the merits. 20 2 Even under
modern pleading standards, the courts are able to make new prece-
dents without a full trial by using Rule 12(b)(6).2 °
To summarize, the courts should be allowed to decide a matter
of law at early stages in order to facilitate early appellate review.
This facilitation will not hinder the objectives of liberal pleading,
because both parties will be given adequate opportunities to assert
their positions. In this sense, Rule 12(b)(6) proceedings are "a
clean, effective method of focussing attention on difficult questions
of law and of aiding it to develop in accord with the needs of soci-
ety." 204 Accordingly, the court should be allowed a flexible use of
Rule 12(b)(6) in the B context.
The B context dispute is not a battle over technicalities or
forms, but a substantive battle on the merits. For example, in
Beenken v. Chicago & Northwestern Railroad,0 5 the plaintiff al-
leged that the defendants were negligent in failing to equip a rail-
road boxcar with adequate warning devices such as reflectors, re-
flectorized tape or paint, or lights, and caused an accident between
the plaintiff's car and the boxcar. The court granted a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, refusing to find negligence.20 6 In Beenken, if the
court had interpreted the law in the light most favorable to plain-
tiff, and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the court might
have concluded that the defendant had been negligent. However,
such a conclusion is clearly inappropriate.
Some commentators point out that the court should be espe-
cially reluctant to dismiss on the basis of an inadequate complaint
when the asserted theory of liability is novel or extreme. The rea-
son given is that it is important for new legal theories to be ex-
plored and assayed in the light of actual facts rather than in a
202. Roberts, supra note 9, at 426.
203. See, e.g., Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Murdock,
861 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1988). Although the district court had dismissed the
claim, the court held that the imposition of a constructive trust on the fiduciary's
alleged ill-gotten profits in favor of all plan participants and beneficiaries was an
appropriate remedy and that the participants had standing to sue, even though
they had already received their actuarially vested plan benefits. Id.
204. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.2, at 239.
205. 367 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Iowa 1973).
206. The court stated, "the law seems clearly to negate any such duty." Id. at
1138 (emphasis added).
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pleader's suppositions.20 However, the persuasiveness of the the-
ory depends on the quality of presented facts rather than the
quantity of actual allegations. Accordingly, a plaintiff who wishes
to present a novel or an extreme theory can assert her justification
with important facts and a well-articulated theory. If the plaintiff
can show some substantive need for justice, the court may not
grant the motion to dismiss.
If the Conley standard is applied to the B context, the sub-
stantive interception function would be lost; and the court and the
parties would have to suffer the time consuming, aggravating, and
expensive trial process. However, some judges have improperly ad-
"vocated application of the Conley standard to the B context. For
instance, in Faulkner Advertising Associates, Inc. v. Nissan Motor
Corp.,208 the Fourth Circuit finally granted a motion to dismiss be-
cause the plaintiff could not state a claim as a matter of law under
the alleged situation.2 °9 In that case, the issue was whether or not
there was a "tying agreement" under the Sherman Act. Nissan had
increased the wholesale prices of its cars and trucks in order to pay
for both increased advertising at the national level and new adver-
tising to be developed by Nissan and its national advertising
agency.210 At the same time Nissan ceased making monetary distri-
butions and contributions to the advertising efforts of the local
dealer association.211 Since the plaintiffs alleged all the related im-
portant facts, including damages and proximate cause, the ques-
tion was not in a factual interception context, but in a substantive
interception context. Although the legal question might have been
difficult, it was appropriately decided in the majority opinion and
the claim was dismissed. However, citing the Conley standard,the
dissent disagreed with this conclusion.212 Certainly, if the Conley
standard was applied in the B context, the court could not avoid
denying the motion to dismiss. However, this interpretation would
mean that Rule 12(b)(6) would never play a role in substantive in-
terception. Although the dissenters may argue different substan-
tive views, the Conley standard should not be used to support
their position, because its application is not appropriate in the B
context.
207. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1357, at 341-343.
208. 945 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1991).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. 905 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1990).
212. Faulkner Advertising, 945 F.2d at 696.
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In the B context, the test for disposition of the motion de-
pends on the jurisdiction's requirements for stating a claim or
cause of action.2 13 In particular, the burden of persuasion in a Rule
12(b)(6) motion should be carefully considered under the adver-
sary system. The movant has the burden to show the nonexistence
of legal relief in arguable issues. Unless the movant can adequately
show that the claim cannot be legally sustained, the court should
not grant the Rule 12(b)(6) motion. If the defendant successfully
satisfies this burden within the short period of pleading, the court
should grant the motion. Since Rule 12(b)(6) motions, summary
judgments, and judgments as a matter of law are all used to elimi-
nate claims which are not legally sustainable, the court may often
postpone the decision. However, if the court reasonably concludes
that the claim shall not be legally sustained, the judge may decide
to dismiss the complaint.
2. Suspicion Regarding Implementation of Substantive Law
Commentators are suspicious of Rule 12(b)(6) substantive law
dismissals for several reasons. First, a multitude of factors or fac-
tual matters cannot be adequately assessed at the pleading
stage.214 Second, using pleadings as a means to evaluate the whole
of the plaintiff's allegations may tempt courts to question the fac-
tual conclusions on which the plaintiff has rested his claim.21 5
Third, under the reasonable basis standard in the B context, bulk-
ier allegations and an unnecessary increase in pretrial motions di-
rected at legal arguments may result. Fourth, substantive intercep-
tion by the district judge may be reversed, and this may prolong
the process of reaching final decisions. Let us review these
considerations.
First, deciding cases based on substantive law at the pleading
stage is not the same as at summary judgement or at another stage
in the proceedings. Deciding substantive law at pleading must be
limited to the basis of the pleading. Although this decision does
not always work, it can work well in some situations. If a pleader is
concerned about legal issues, he may state particularly detailed al-
legations in the complaint, as long as the statement is not
213. See, e.g., SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 2, § 50, at 200.
214. Marcus, supra note 12, at 459. Marcus argues that, even where a severa-
ble issue can be identified, a reliable decision on the merits at the outset may be
impossible. Id. at 462.
215. Marcus, supra note 12, at 465.
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excessive.
For example, in Heart Disease Research Foundation v. Gen-
eral Motors Co. 16 the court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint
which alleged an antitrust violation; specifically, conspiring to sup-
press development of motor vehicle pollution control devices. The
complaint did not allege any facts to support an antitrust conspir-
acy. This is a case in which the plaintiff should have alleged more
detailed theories and facts. Unless the plaintiff specifically alleges
some exceptional grounds, the court is correct in deciding the case
on ordinary legal theories.21
Second, the courts might mistakenly attempt to question the
factual conclusions on which the plaintiff has rested his claim by
using pleadings as an opportunity to evaluate the whole of the
plaintiff's allegations. However, this mistake occurs not because
the court unfairly decides substantive law, but because the stan-
dards of Rule 12(b)(6) are unclear. The court may reasonably de-
cide legal questions, but may not reach factual conclusions. The
court may have to consider the F context after considering the B
context.21 Even when a decision on a 12(b)(6) motion is irrelevant
to substantive law of the case, some courts inadvertently perform
fact-finding in dismissing a case by relying on the defendant's fac-
tual affidavits.21 9
In the B context too, the court should be careful not to com-
mit fact-finding. For example, in Mescall v. Burrus,220 the district
court's dismissal was reversed because certain findings of fact were
made beyond the allegations of the complaint.22 Although the dis-
trict court could have tried substantive interception in the B con-
text, it actually relied on its own fact-finding. In any context, the
court must take factual allegations as true in deciding a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, and examine only the plaintiff's complaint.2 2 If
216. 463 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1972).
217. But see Marcus, supra note 12, at 435-36.
218. See, e.g., California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508 (1972)(Stewart, J., concurring) (concluding that dismissal was proper in the B
context and improper in the F context).
219. See, e.g., Carter v. Barry, 468 F.2d 821, 822 (2d Cir. 1972).
220. 603 F.2d 1266 (7th Cir. 1979).
221. Id. at 1269.
222. See, e.g., Electrical Construction & Maintenance Co., Inc. v. Maeda Pa-
cific Corp., 764 F.2d 619, 620 (9th Cir. 1985); Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1565
(10th Cir. 1991)(reversing the district court's dismissal of a claim because the dis-
trict court reviewed the materials outside of the complaint in determining
whether to grant defendant's motion to dismiss without converting to a summary
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the movant wishes to test the factual underpinnings of the com-
plaint, she may submit proper evidence and move for summary
judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules.223 As long as the
court requires this procedure, we need not worry about factual
conclusions.
Although the court sometimes appears to reach factual conclu-
sions, the real problem in this regard often lies in differences or
interpretation of substantive laws. For example, in Hishon v. King
& Spalding,224 the court denied the motion to dismiss where a for-
mer associate sued a law firm alleging Title VII sex-based discrimi-
nation; but in Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology,225 the
court granted the motion in a similar case involving sex-based dis-
crimination by stating "because of the timing of the alleged dis-
crimination, she has no remedy under either Title VII of the Fed-
eral Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, or the Illinois Fair
Employment Practices Act, although the victim of comparable dis-
crimination occurring today would clearly have a remedy under ei-
ther of those statutes.112 6 Thus, as a result of attitudes on the in-
terpretation of laws, the same pleading standard appears stringent
at one time and mild at another time for plaintiffs.2 7
Third, although the "reasonable doubt" standard may en-
courage defendants to move under Rule 12(b)(6), it will not cause
unnecessary proceedings insofar as Rule 11 works on a reasonable
basis standard. In the B context, this standard should be used to
prevent bulkier allegations and an unnecessary increase in pretrial
motions directed at legal arguments. As long as reasonable legal
arguments are presented by the case, the courts must examine
them sooner or later. Additionally, such legal arguments may facil-
itate settlement at an early stage, because each party's position
and relative strengths in the matter may be disclosed in the
process.
Fourth, part of the suspicion over implementing substantive
law may involve doubts that the trial judge is trustworthy. For ex-
ample, in Hishon v. King & Spalding,228 when a former associate
sued a law firm alleging Title VII sex-based discrimination, the
judgment motion and complying with Rule 56).
223. See, e.g., LaBounty v. Adler, 933 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 1991).
224. 469 U.S. 69 (1984).
225. 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975).
226. Id. at 822.
227. See supra part II-B-I.
228. 469 U.S. 69 (1984).
1993]
39
Hamabe: Functions of Rule 12(b)(6) in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedur
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1993
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Title VII
was inapplicable to the selection of partners by a partnership, and
the appellate court affirmed.22 9 However, the Supreme Court held
that Title VII is applicable to the partnership of a law firm. From
this case, the opponents of substantive interception may argue that
the court should not have dismissed the claims due to incorrect
legal interpretation. However, the courts below could not decide
the case without reliable precedent, and could not control the case
in accordance with specific conditions for the remedy which the
Supreme Court might change later. Thus, this process is unavoida-
ble, and each court must be left to its own interpretation.
3. Mixed Question of Fact and Law?
Some commentators and courts have presented the question of
how a court should resolve mixed questions of fact and law in de-
ciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions. 230 This question at bottom is
whether certain facts fall within certain abstract legal norms, such
as "negligence," "materiality," or "proximate cause." The answer
is theoretically a legal decision on the basis of some legal theory.
The answer is not a factual finding based on evidence. Therefore,
this question must be ultimately viewed as a question of law. Nev-
ertheless, when "reasonable people" would differ on an issue, the
analysis has been to treat these issues as matters of fact. ' Only if
the concept is so obvious that reasonable minds cannot differ is the
issue appropriately resolved as a matter of law.2 3 2 Three examples
of potential mixed questions of law and fact will be dealt with in
turn.
(i) Materiality
The issue of materiality in securities fraud might be character-
ized as a mixed question of law and fact, involving as it does the
application of a legal standard to a particular set of facts.233 How-
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., Tamari v. Bache & Co., 565 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1977)
(stating that mere unsupported conclusions of fact or mixed fact and law are not
to be taken as admitted).
231. TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, (1976). One may in-
quire why judges are not trusted to possess "reasonable" minds.
232. Id. at 450. In this case, the court considered this issue at the summary
judgment stage.
233. Id. Using this reasoning, the Second Circuit reversed dismissal of a se-
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ever, the court may decide whether the "materiality" is so obvious
that no reasonable mind would differ on the issue and, if so, is
"material". These questions can be decided as a matter of law.
When the court decides legal questions in proceedings, the court
need not find any fact at all, unlike at the summary judgment
stage. If the "materiality" is not so obvious, the question becomes
a matter of fact. Therefore, the court can clearly distinguish
whether it is a question of law or fact.
For example, in Durning v. First Boston Corp.,23" although the
court stated "whether an official statement adequately discloses
callability of the bonds is a mixed question of law and fact" in a
securities fraud action," 5 the court denied the motion to dismiss
because it was not obvious to the court whether or not the official
statement was ambiguous. In this case, the court reached the con-
clusion assuming that the plaintiff's factual allegations were true.
The court did not examine any factual issues. The issue was
whether the court could reasonably conclude that the official state-
ment was obviously ambiguous or not. Since the court concluded
that the answer to this issue was not obvious, the issue became a
matter for fact-finding.
(ii) Proximate Cause
"Proximate cause" is another troublesome question of law.
Plaintiff's allegations regarding proximate cause often cannot be
divided into legal ones and factual ones because they are "mixed."
The court may consider two questions: whether the plaintiff states
a claim on the theory of proximate cause as a matter of law; and
whether he sufficiently stated facts to support proximate cause.
For example, in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.,238 the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant's negligent acts permitted the continued employ-
ment of an allegedly defalcating bank officer.237 In this action one
curities class action. Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir 1985).
234. 815 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 944, (1987).
235. Id. at 1268. ("The determination requires delicate assessments of the
inferences a 'reasonable shareholder' would draw from a given set of facts and the
significance of those inferences to him, and these assessments are particularly
ones for the trier of fact.. .Only if the disclosure is so obvious that reasonable
minds cannot differ, the issue is appropriately resolved as a matter of law.") (cit-
ing TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976)).
236. 74 F.R.D. 357 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
237. Id. at 358. The plaintiff alleged in the complaint that "the wrongful acts
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of the elements the plaintiff had to show was proximate cause. If
defendant's negligent acts could be the proximate cause of the con-
tinued employment of the bank officer, the defendant's motion to
dismiss should be denied. Otherwise, the motion to dismiss should
be granted. Accordingly, the issue is not the standard of a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, but the standard of proximate cause under the
applicable substantive law.
The court ruled, in accordance with Oklahoma law, that as a
general rule the proximate cause of injury is a question of fact, and
only becomes a question of law where the evidence together with
all inferences which may be properly deduced therefrom is insuffi-
cient to show a causal connection between the alleged wrong and
the injury.2 s3 The court concluded that there was no causal connec-
tion between them, and granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a
matter of law, by ruling that the plaintiff only asserted a "condi-
tion" but not "proximate cause" between the alleged negligence
and the injuries.2 9
Similarly, in Herman v. C.O. Porter Machinery Co.,2 40 the
court granted a motion to dismiss because there was no causal rela-
tionship between an allegedly defective sa*v and plaintiff's inju-
ries.241 In Herman, if the defective condition had not been clearly
stated in the complaint, the court might have dismissed the case
for failure to state a "defect." Assuming that the plaintiff did
plead the defective condition well, the court seems to have denied
causal relationship. However, it is not clear why there was not a
of [the alleged defalcating bank officer], aided and abetted by the negligence and
omission of the defendant Merrill Lynch, combined to permit the continued em-
ployment of defendant... by Oklahoma State Bank and to proximately cause the
damage and loss sustained." Id.
238. Id. at 360. Assuming that proximate cause is a factual question, as long
as the plaintiff asserts it in the complaint, the court should not grant a 12(b)(6)
motion. However, if proximate cause is a legal issue, the plaintiff must assert facts
enough to support it, and the court decides the case pursuant to the applicable
laws. Since a question of law can be tested using a motion, the court may grant
the motion to dismiss by finding that proximate cause did not exist.
239. Id. at 359. The court used the proximate cause versus mere condition
doctrine. Id. Under the doctrine, where the negligence complained of only creates
a condition which thereafter reacts with a subsequent, independent, unforesee-
able, distinct agency and produces an injury, the original negligence is the remote
rather than the proximate cause thereof. Id.
240. 333 F. Supp. 416 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
241. It was manufactured by a company insured by the defendant product
liability insurer. Id.
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finding of causal relationship between the defective condition and
plaintiff's injures.
In both Hartford Accident and Herman, the courts flatly de-
nied "causal connection" or "causal relationship", even though
"negligence" or "defectiveness" appeared to be well pleaded. '2" It
may be argued that the pleading standards influence the issue of
whether "proximate cause" can be recognized. For example, if the
complaint is construed favorably to the pleader, the causation re-
quirement may not be so strict. Certainly, the court might not con-
sider the claim together with all inferences which may be properly
deduced therefrom at the stage of a pretrial motion. However, real
problems sometimes lie somewhere other than in the "pleading
standard," such as in interpretation of substantive law, burden of
pleading, or selection of "essential" elements, each of which will be
dealt with in turn.
First, whether causation could be reasonably denied as a mat-
ter of substantive law is questionable. If the substantive law
strictly limited causation, the court could not have avoided dis-
missing the case. However, if the substantive law did not narrow
the scope of causation so strictly, the court should not have modi-
fied the substantive law with a pleading rule. Rather, the court
must construe all pleading so as to do substantial justice.2 43
Second, it is not clear whether the court paid attention to the
burden of proof and the burden upon the movant in a Rule 12(b)
(6) motion.244 If the movant could not have successfully shown
non-existence of proximate cause, the court should have denied the
motion. Although a plaintiff must allege facts showing a causal re-
lation in general,245 the movant should essentially bear the burden
of persuasion in the granting of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion as to both
legal arguments and factual allegations. For a defendant to suc-
cessfully deny proximate cause in pleading, unless the allegations
242. In the two cases, the court considered the sufficiency of the factual alle-
gations, but decided, as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs had not stated a claim
for damages. Id.; Herman, 333 F. Supp. at 416.
243. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f).
244. See infra part II-E-3. See also Leahy v. Board of Trustees of Commu-
nity College District No. 508, 912 F.2d 917, 921-22 (7th Cir. 1990) (ruling that the
plaintiff must allege the requisite causal connection between municipality's policy
or custom and the plaintiff's injury).
245. JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, §3.11, at 157. Also, the burden of pleading
often corresponds to burden of production at trial. SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN,
supra note 2, § 49, at 194.
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are highly improbable, is difficult.
Third, whether proximate cause is an essential element in lib-
eral pleading is also questionable. Even though "negligence" or
"defective condition" is clearly an essential element of the claim,
proximate cause may not be an essential element.246 Since Form 9
does not seem to require special allegations for "proximate cause,"
the plaintiff may not have to allege it. Even if Form 9 defines prox-
imate cause by the phrase "[a]s a result, 24 7 this does not state
anything substantial. Although proximate cause is generally
deemed an essential element,248 the plaintiff may not need to plead
it in detail, because it is difficult to objectively express proximate
cause.
If substantive law provides that proximate cause is a matter of
fact,' the court may question whether a conceivable set of facts are
alleged in support of proximate cause.249 If the substantive law
provides that "proximate cause" is not a matter of fact, the court
has to decide it as a matter of law. In general, since the plaintiff
should be given the opportunity to scrutinize the defendants' in-
side information within the scope of discovery, it is inappropriate
to use an exceptionally strict standard to decide proximate cause.
If the alleged facts reasonably support proximate cause, the court
should not dismiss the case at the pleading stage. If it is not clear
whether or not there are facts enough to establish proximate cause
under the governing law, the court should not dismiss the case at
the pleading stage. Because the movant could not successfully
show nonexistence of proximate cause, the court must deny the
Rule 12(b)(6) motion. However, since the court only postponed its
final decision regarding proximate cause, it may become a question
of whether the court should grant a motion for summary judgment
or judgment as a matter of law after the plaintiff is allowed certain
246. In a civil rights case, when a causal connection must be established be-
tween the act or omission of a supervisory defendant and the alleged deprivation
of plaintiff's constitutional rights, the Eleven Circuit ruled that the connection
may be established where (i) a history of widespread prior abuse puts the official
on notice of the need for improved training or supervision; or (ii) a single abuse
occurs that is so outrageous as to give rise to an inference that a supervisor must
have breached his duty of proper supervision. Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227,
1241-1242 (11th Cir. 1985). Under this standard, a plaintiff must plead only a
history or an outrageous abuse as an essential element, but proximate cause itself
does not seem to be an essential element.
247. JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, § 3.16, at 171.
248. Id.
249. This question can be viewed as a matter of factual interception.
[Vol. 15:119
44
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol15/iss2/1
FUNCTIONS OF RULE 12(B)(6)
discovery.
4. Overlapping A and B Contexts
In the A context, a claim does not have a legal ground. If a set
of facts automatically calls for a dismissal, the claim can be dis-
missed in the A context. However, if there is any doubt whether
the claim may be legally denied, the claim should be considered in
the B context. For example, in Abramson v. Brownstein,250 the
court affirmed dismissal of a complaint on a statute of limitations
ground. In reaching the conclusion, the court discussed whether
the applicable state law violated the Commerce Clause, whether
the statute of limitations was tolled by an agreement of the parties,
and whether the statute was tolled by estoppel. 51 Accordingly,
these three questions were decided in the B context, but the claim
was dismissed under the statute of limitations in the A context.
E. Factual Interception
1. Interpretations of the Conley Standard
How is the Conley standard applied to the D, E and F con-
texts? 52 If the Conley standard is taken literally, "doubt" would
be strictly construed, and might preclude dismissal would be pre-
cluded in any case in which the plaintiff invokes a valid legal the-
ory.253 Under the Conley standard, the issue is "whether the claim-
ant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims,"264 or
"whether, in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and with every
doubt resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim
for relief.' 255 Under this strict interpretation, the court may dis-
miss the complaint, unless it appears beyond every doubt that no
facts exist to support the plaintiff's claim. The complaint's allega-
tions are not only taken as true but also construed in the light
250. 897 F.2d 389 (9th Cii. 1990).
251. Id.
252. Willging points out that the last three categories are the troublesome
ones. WILLGING, supra note 5, at 16. It appears that he views the Conley standard
as a standard for the F context. Id. at 18.
253. Marcus, supra note 12, at 434.
254. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). Since the Scheuer court cited
the Conley standard and did not distinguish it, Scheuer and Conley apparently
are decided under the same standard. Accordingly, whether the claimant is enti-
tled to offer evidence to support the claim depends on the Conley standard.
255. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1357, at 332-36.
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most favorable to plaintiff.2 56 Thus, the notice theory of pleading
requires "strict scrutiny" of the motion. Under this interpretation,
Rule 12(b)(6) can perform virtually no factual interception
function.2 57
However, some courts have suggested that the "doubt" in
Conley can be limited doubt to some extent, or applied only to
limited elements.2 58 The Conley standard was articulated in the F
context. Although some may interpret the Conley standard as not
addressing the issue of whether the claim was adequately de-
scribed,259 it is ordinarily viewed to have been a determination of
the sufficiency of a complaint. 60 In Conley, although the complaint
might not have stated a "discriminatory intention" as an element
of the cause of action, the plaintiff alleged an adequate and con-
ceivable set of facts in support of a discrimination case.26  It is un-
reasonable to extend the application of the Conley standard to
every context, but it is desirable to apply it fully in the F context.
2. Cause of Action and Essential Elements
Rule 8(a) clearly requires a pleader to set forth only "a short
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief." However short and plain, the complaint must still reveal
the essential elements of a claim. What are the "essential ele-
ments"? It is often difficult to differentiate between the essential
256. Id. at 304.
257. Louis, supra note 17, at 1033.
258. See, e.g., Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th
Cir. 1984) ("Conley has never been interpreted literally . . . a complaint must
contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements
necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory."); American
Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 727 (7th Cir. 1986)(Conley language
"should not be taken literally; for taken literally it would permit dismissal only in
frivolous cases. If the plaintiff pleads facts, and the facts shows that he is entitled
to no relief, the complaint should be dismissed.").
259. Himelrick, supra note 104, at 374.
260. See, e.g., 5A WRIGHT & MMLER, supra note 3, § 1357, at 325.
261. The plaintiffs alleged that a railroad purported to abolish 45 jobs held
by plaintiffs or other African Americans all of whom were either discharged or
demoted, though in truth the 45 jobs were not abolished but instead filled by
whites as the African Americans were ousted. Conley, 355 U.S. at 43. Plaintiffs
also alleged that they were rehired to fill their old jobs but with loss of seniority;
and that despite repeated pleas by petitioners, the Union did nothing to protect
them against these discriminatory discharges and refused to give them protection
comparable to that given white employees. Id.
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and nonessential elements of various claims.262 It is meaningless to
merely shift the issue from "cause of action" to "essential ele-
ments." Is there a distinction between stating a cause of action and
stating a claim upon which relief can be granted? 263
(i) Necessity of Essential Elements
The complaint should not be. burdened "with possibly hun-
dreds of specific instances; and if it were, it would be compara-
tively meaningless at trial where the parties could adduce further
pertinent evidence if discovered."264 There is no pleading require-
ment that a plaintiff state a cause of action upon peril of having
his complaint dismissed.26 5
However, a plaintiff must present essential elements in the
complaint, because he cannot state a claim without them. A claim
should include operative or substantive elements, as long as these
concepts are meaningful.2 6 Logically, essential elements must be
required as the minimum components of a claim.
Rule 12(b)(6) does not test whether plaintiffs may ultimately
prevail, but examines whether the allegations are sufficient to allow
them to conduct discovery in an attempt to prove their allega-
tion.2 67 If the courts allow a plaintiff to keep her action alive on
only the skimpiest statement of claim, "the defendant cannot get
rid of the litigation without first undergoing discovery, which can
be time consuming, aggravating, and expensive. "268 Also, "if a
pleader cannot allege definitely and in good faith the existence of
an essential element of his claim, it is difficult to see why this basic
deficiency should not be exposed at the point of minimum expen-
262. JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, §3.6, at 146.
263. See, e.g., Garcia v. Hilton Hotel Int'l, 97 F. Supp. 5, 7 (D.P.R. 1951).
264. Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir. 1957).
265. See, e.g., Garcia v. Hilton Hotel Int'l, 97 F. Supp. 5, 7 (D.P.R. 1951). See
also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.7, at 253.
266. See, e.g., Fleming v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 922 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1990)
("[T]he deference afforded to the plaintiff does not render the requirements
meaningless."); Smith, Kline & French, Lab. v. A.H. Robins Co., 61 F.R.D. 24, 28
(E.D. Pa. 1973) (stating that a claim has been defined as "the aggregate of opera-
tive facts which give rise to a right enforceable in the courts.").
267. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Jackam v. Hospital Corp. of Am.
Mideast, 800 F.2d 1577, 1579-80 (11th Cir.1986) (stating that the issue is not
whether the plaintiffs might ultimately prevail on the "piercing the corporate
veil" theory, but whether the allegations are sufficient to allow them to conduct
discovery in an attempt to prove their allegations).
268. JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, §3.6, at 148.
1993]
47
Hamabe: Functions of Rule 12(b)(6) in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedur
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1993
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
diture of time and money by the parties and the court. ' 269 Proce-
durally, essential elements should be required as the condition for
discovery against defendants.
Even without the special or heightened pleading rule, a plain-
tiff may be required to state specific or particularized facts. Al-
though this seems to be at odds with liberal pleading, some such
requirements are appropriate, as long as essential elements are
limited by appropriate allocation of the burden of pleading con-
cerning the essential elements.270 The Advisory Committee's 1955
Report appears to have endorsed this proposition.2 71 Appendix
forms and Conley can also be read to include "essential elements."
In addition, since Rule 11 has require reasonable investigation and
research, 272 a plaintiff should assert the outcome of this investiga-
tion and research concerning the essential elements. If a plaintiff
cannot get any information about the facts going beyond pure con-
jecture, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the complaint can-
not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 73
Still, the Federal Rules allow plaintiffs at least two significant
liberal pleading rules. First, since the Federal Rules do not require
a plaintiff to set out the precise facts on which the claim is
based,7 4 the plaintiff's statement should not be examined strictly.
Second, a plaintiff may state facts in a general or conclusory fash-
ion concerning non-essential elements and essential elements for
which the other parties have the burden of pleading. However,
once a plaintiff has referred to essential elements, he knows that
he must make some allegations about them.276 In a case where a
plaintiff can be reasonably expected to state an essential element,
269. Daves v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 114 F. Supp. 643, 645 (D. Haw. 1953).
270. See infra part II-E-3.
271. See supra text accompanying note 157.
272. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
273. See, e.g., Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., Inc., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir.
1984).
274. See, e.g., Sinclair v. Kleindienst, 711 F.2d 291, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Mu-
nicipal Util. Bd. of Albertville v. Alabama Power Co., 934 F.2d 1492, 1501 (11th
Cir. 1991) (stating that "the alleged facts need not be spelled out with exactitude,
nor must recovery appear imminent") (quoting Quality Foods de Centeo America
v. Latin Am. Agribusiness Dev. Corp., 711 F.2d 989, 995 (11th Cir. 1983.)).
275. See, e.g., Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., Inc., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir.
1984) (holding that the complaint stated a claim under RICO, but did not state a
claim under the Sherman Act, even though it used antitrust language such as
"predatory pricing" and "price fixing". Due to the fact that as long as the plain-
tiffs used antitrust language, they were aware of the necessity to allege them).
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his case may be dismissed for failure to state it sufficiently.2 76 De-
spite the necessity of essential elements, when a complaint omits
facts that would clearly establish the case, it seems fair to assume
that those facts do not exist.2 77 Accordingly, it will be fair to re-
quire certain essential elements in a specific or particularized man-
ner under the Federal Rules.
Based on the foregoing, a plaintiff should be required to set
forth factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting all
the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some
viable or actionable legal theory. 78 The court is under no duty to
"conjure up unpleaded facts to turn a frivolous claim into substan-
tial one. 2s79 This minimum requirement has been equally applied
not only to "disfavored" actions, but also to ordinary civil cases
such as breach of contract cases.28 0
(ii) Basic Nature
If the plaintiff has clarified the basic kind, nature2 8 1 or context
of a law suit, the complaint should be deemed to have stated es-
sential elements. The complaint in Dioguardi v. Durning 282 re-
vealed the basic nature of the dispute.283 When a complaint omits
facts relating to the basic nature of the dispute which the plaintiff
could easily state, if they existed, and which would clearly domi-
276. See, e.g., Donald v. Orfila, 618 F. Supp. 645 (D.C.D.C. 1985) (plaintiff
stated only that defendant "acted in bad faith and beyond the scope of his au-
thority by maliciously interfering with plaintiff's employment rights and inten-
tionally causing plaintiff to suffer mental and emotional distress"). The court dis-
missed the claim because such a conclusory statement was not admitted on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. Id.
277. See, e.g., E.J. v. Hamilton County, 707 F. Supp. 314, 316 (S.D. Ohio
1989).
278. See, e.g., Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., Inc., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir.
1984); In re Plywood Antitrust Litigation, 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. 1981).
279. See, e.g., 27 GOGER ET AL., supra note 57, § 62:468, at 580.
280. See, e.g., Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513 (1st Cir. 1988) (af-
firming a dismissal of franchisees action alleging breach of contract).
281. A jurisdiction adopted the term "true nature of the claim" under mod-
ern pleading. VA. CT. R. 1:4(d). It provides that every pleading shall state the facts
on which the party relies, and it shall be sufficient if it clearly informs the oppo-
site party of the true nature of the claim. Ian James Wilson & William Louis
Payne, Note, The Specificity of Pleading in Modern Civil Practice: Addressing
Common Misconceptions, 25 U. RICH. L. REv. 135 (1990).
282. 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
283. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.8, at 254.
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nate the case, it seems fair to assume that those facts do not
exist.2 84
In civil rights cases, some courts appear to hold a similar view.
For example, in Means v. City of Chicago,"8 5 the court denied a
motion to dismiss when the plaintiff alleged that two defendant
police officers arrested a pers6n without probable cause and shot
him in the head without provocation, killing him.28 Additionally,
the plaintiff alleged that the City of Chicago proximately caused
the victim's death by improperly hiring, screening, and training of-
ficers, by failing to discipline the officers for past misconduct, and
by encouraging officers to use deadly or excessive force.287 In
Means, the plaintiff showed that the subject of the lawsuit was the
policy of using guns because a formal policy or informal custom
can specify the nature of the dispute.2 88
Accordingly, that decision, as well as Dioguardi and Conley,
may be viewed to require only that the plaintiff clarify the basic
kind, nature or context which will be the subject of the law suit.
Thus, if the plaintiff shows the basic kind, nature or context, the
complaint should not be dismissed. Although the plaintiff does not
have to specify or narrow the issue to be litigated, it is not so bur-
densome for a plaintiff to show the basic subject of the suit.
(iii) Specificity of Important Occurrences
A plaintiff must state the subject of the suit. When a plaintiff
does not show any important occurrences or circumstances, the
court cannot understand what was wrong. If a plaintiff cannot
state any important or essential occurrences, it may be fair to as-
sume that those facts do not exist or that the claim is frivolous. A
plaintiff can clarify important or essential occurrences in the com-
plaint in order to show the specific incidents upon which the com-
plaint is based.289 Although a plaintiff does not have to allege
284. See, e.g., O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 n.3 (1st cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 914, (1977); Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d
434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988); E.J. v. Hamilton County, 707 F. Supp. 314, 316 (S.D.
Ohio 1989).
285. 535 F. Supp. 455 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. See, e.g., Dioguardi, 139 F.2d 774 (complaint revealed the specific inci-
dents upon which the complaint was based). See also, FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra
note 11, § 5.8, at 254.
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when, where and how every relevant event occurred,'2 90 he should
allege these concerning essential or important events which he
surely knows. In order to avoid general or conclusory allegations,
the court may require plaintiff to state such particularized facts.2 91
In Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi,2 9 the plaintiff alleged that
he had been employed by the defendant municipal corporation and
that the four individual defendants voted to terminate his employ-
ment "because the plaintiff had exercised his First Amendment
privileges. '"93 The court stated, in granting the motion to dismiss,
that the allegations failed to indicate when, where, and how Rotolo
had exercised his First Amendment privileges.294 Although this de-
cision can be criticized because it adopted a "strict standard" dif-
ferent from the ordinary standard, it is defensible insofar as it es-
tablishes that the plaintiff should state when, where and how some
important fact occurred. In Rotolo, the plaintiff could have alleged
some related facts describing the manner in which he himself exer-
cised his First Amendment privileges. Yet, although the plaintiff
did not have to allege detailed circumstances relating to the termi-
nation, the complaint should have made clear the relevant impor-
tant circumstances relating to his First Amendment privileges. In
contrast, since the defendant had knowledge of the facts relating
to the real cause of the termination, perhaps more than the plain-
tiff,2 95 the plaintiff should have been allowed to allege the cause of
termination in a general or conclusory fashion.
Thus, the complaint need only outline a recognized legal or
equitable claim which sufficiently pinpoints the time, place and
circumstances of the alleged important or essential occurrences.2 19
290. American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 727 (7th Cir. 1986)
("[A] complaint is not required to allege all, or any, of the facts logically entailed
by the claim.").
291. See, e.g., Municipal Util. Bd. v. Alabama Power Co., 934 F.2d 1493, 1501
(11th Cir. 1991) (stating that a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts so that each
element of the alleged antitrust violation can be identified).
292. 532 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1976).
293. Id. at 921.
294. Id. at 923. This requirement is similar to special pleading under Rule 9.
See Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985) (observing that the
absence of particularity with respect to the alleged fraudulent participation of
defendants in the coal venture scheme, and the absence of specification of any
times, dates, places, or other details of that alleged fraudulent involvement was
contrary to the fundamental purposes of Rule 9(b)).
295. Blaze, supra note 17, at 954.
296. See, e.g., Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir. 1988); 27
19931
51
Hamabe: Functions of Rule 12(b)(6) in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedur
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1993
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
The courts have routinely held that complaints comply with this
standard if they allege the specific conduct violating the plaintiff's
rights, the time and the place of that conduct, and the identity of
the responsible persons.2 97 Thus, courts have held that if a plaintiff
identifies the time, place and nature of the misrepresentation or
omissions, he has satisfied his pleading burden.29
(iv) Omitted Elements of A Cause of Action
The essential elements to be pleaded by the plaintiff cannot
be omitted. However, some elements of causes of action whose bur-
den of proof at trial is put on plaintiff may be omitted.2 99 Although
the definition of cause of action "varies",300 a plaintiff must show a
cause of action by the end of the pleading or the decision on- a
summary judgment motion. In contrast, only "essential elements"
must be shown in the complaint. Accordingly, the liberal pleading
standard will allow plaintiffs to omit certain elements of a cause of
action as long as they are not "essential".301
Under liberal pleading, what elements of a cause of action may
plaintiff omit in the complaint? First, a plaintiff should be allowed
to omit the information which the defendant ordinarily has but the
plaintiff does not have. For example, the exact description of the
defendant's conduct may be an element of a cause of action, but
should not be an essential element to state a claim in a complaint.
Second, a plaintiff may omit some reasonably inferable facts be-
cause facts can be supplemented by such reasonable inferences as
may be drawn in plaintiff's favor."0 2 Third, of course, unimportant
facts or unessential elements to support a basic nature or subject
of the suit should be omitted, because the plaintiff is required to
plead only essential elements. The pleader should be allowed to
GOGER ET AL.., supra note 57, §62:468, at 580.
297. Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 666 (3d Cir. 1988).
298. See, e.g., In re Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 890 F.2d 628, 645 (3d Cir. 1989);
Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987); Goldman v.
Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1069-1070 (2d Cir. 1985).
299. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.8, at 253-54.
300. 4 CEPLA & PALMER, supra note 4, §14.158, at 244. Some commentators
think that the Federal Rules adopted Clark's concept of cause of action. See, e.g.,
Wilson & Payne, Note, supra note 206, at 143. However, in this article, "cause of
action" means the substantive elements establishing a claim under code pleading
or common law pleading.
301. See also JAMEs ET AL., supra note 18, §3.11, at 158.
302. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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state a claim without these unnecessary allegations.
If a claim has been stated without some unnecessary elements
of a cause of action, the pleader may state a claim by using general
terms.'" In such a case, the action will continue into the discovery
stage, and determination of the legal sufficiency of the claim will
be postponed until the entire cause of action is sufficiently
clarified.30"
(v) General Structure of Essential Elements
One noted authority describe the general structure of the sub-
stantive legal elements of a claim as follows: (1) a description of
the relationship or situation of the parties; (2) a description of the
conduct of the defendant, which the law proscribes as a violation
of duty; (3) the consequences to plaintiff resulting from the de-
fendant's conduct that the law recognizes as compensable or justi-
fying other redress; and (4) a demand or prayer for relief3 5
If the plaintiff must state these element clearly and precisely,
these elements seem to be tantamount to the cause of action. How-
ever, unlike the cause of action, "essential elements" should not be
strictly examined. For example, under the Federal Rules, negli-
gence can be pleaded generally, without detailed specification, as
indicated in Rule 8 (a) and in Form 9. 311 In Form 9, the plaintiff
cannot obtain enough information about the negligence of the de-
fendant, but the statement probably suggests some negligence in
the stated situation. Form 9 certainly states a description of the
conduct of the defendant which the law. may proscribe as a viola-
tion of duty. From this view, the accident itself is an essential ele-
ment, but the precise description of negligence should not be an
essential element to state a claim. Similarly, the consequences to
plaintiff resulting from the defendant's conduct should be those
which the law may recognize as compensable or justifying other
redress. In this regard, proximate causes should not be strictly
required.
Accordingly, although a plaintiff should identify the time,
place and nature of the important occurrences or events in order to
303. JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, §3.6, at 148.
304. Id.
305. Id., §3.15, at 169. Although the substantial legal elements of a claim may
not be equal to the essential elements of pleading, it is definitely directed to the
elements of a claim.
306. 4 CEPLA & PALMER, supra note 4, §14.250, at 368.
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plead element (2), the other elements which plaintiffs cannot ordi-
narily access or plead should not be essential elements.
3. Burden of Pleading and Burden of Movant
In factual interception contexts, the courts should pay great
attention to the burden of pleading and the burden of the movant
in Rule 12(b)(6) proceedings. The burden of pleading an issue is
usually assigned to the party who has the burden of producing evi-
dence on that issue at trial.30 7 Accordingly, plaintiff normally
should not have the burden of pleading the elements on which de-
fendant must introduce proof. 0 8 On the other hand, defendant
generally has the burden of persuasion as the movant in Rule
12(b)(6) motion. 0 Since it is difficult to distinguish between suffi-
cient pleadings and insufficient pleadings under Rule 8(a), the
court should defer to the pleader's statements under the notice
theory. From this view, even if the plaintiff has the burden of
pleading an essential element, the defendant should meet the bur-
den of persuasion regarding that essential element in order to be
granted a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 10
However, no rule of universal and uniform application exists
as to how the law allocates the burden of pleading. 11 Although the
party typically has the burden of pleading the elements as to
which she carries the burden of proof at trial, the burden of plead-
ing need not coincide with the burden of producing evidence. For
example, when a plaintiff sues a defendant on an overdue note,
plaintiff must allege nonpayment to state a claim because an alle-
gation of nonpayment to state a claim is essential. Also, in a slan-
307. SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 2, § 49, at 194.
308. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c). JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, §3.11, at 157. In this
regard, the courts should reconsider the practice of allowing motions to be based
on affirmative defenses. See Rhynette Northcross Hurd, Note, The Propriety of
Permitting Affirmative Defenses to Be Raised by Motion to Dismiss, 20 MEM. ST.
U. L. REV. 411 (1990). However, "when all relevant facts are shown by the court's
own records, of which the court takes notice, the defense may be upheld on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion without requiring an answer." Day v. Moscow, 955 F.2d 807, 811
(2d Cir. 1992).
309. See, e.g., Jackam v. Hospital Corp. of Am. Mideast, 800 F.2d 1577, 1579
(11th Cir. 1986); Currie v. Cayman Resources Corp., 595 F.2d 1364, 1370 (N.D.
Ga. 1984).
310. See, e.g., Collins v. Nagle, 892 F.2d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting that
the moving party must establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact in both Rule 56 motion and Rule 12(b)(6) motion).
311. See, e.g., JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, §3.11, at 157.
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der context, while some courts consider the truth of remarks an
absolute defense, falsity is an essential element that plaintiff must
plead, even though defendant has the burden of introducing evi-
dence of truth.
On the other hand, plaintiff may not have the burden of
pleading facts when the burden of introducing evidence is on the
plaintiff,' Even if plaintiff does have the initial burden of plead-
ing an essential element, the court may impose the burden of per-
suasion on defendant as the movant for dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6). s15 Many commentators criticize the courts for adopting
strict views of pleading in some civil rights actions from various
viewpoints. Some commentators suggest that had the courts paid
attention to the burden of pleading, they might have reached dif-
ferent conclusions. For example, in a civil rights action against a
city, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a deprivation of his consti-
tutional rights was caused by a formal policy or informal custom.3 ""
Under this substantive standard, in La Plant v. Frazier,315 the
court stated that the plaintiff must show an "affirmative link" be-
tween the occurrence of police misconduct and the city's policy or
custom." ' In La Plant, the court concluded that a complaint as-
serting in broad and conclusory fashion that the city did not train
police officers to engage in lawful conduct and customarily refused
to punish officers who engaged in unlawful conduct 1 7 was insuffi-
312. Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 1991). ("[Tlhe eviden-
tiary burden on the non-movant in a summary judgment motion is significantly
greater than in a motion to dismiss.") However, in Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the
non-movant has no evidentiary burden. The burden of pleading on the non-mo-
vant in a summary judgment motion may be significantly greater than in a motion
to dismiss.
313. The burden of pleading the necessary factual averments rests upon the
pleader; initial failure to satisfy the burden in no way obligates an opportunity to
offer matters outside the pleadings. Fleming v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 922 F.2d 20,
24 (1st Cir. 1990). However, the initial burden should be strictly limited to the
essential elements, and the movant should have the burden of persuasion to show
insufficiency of necessary factual averments to the essential elements.
314. Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
315. 564 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
316. Id. at 1098 (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976)). However,
Rizzo may only require a proximate cause. See infra note 321.
317. The plaintiff alleged that the City of Philadelphia did not train its po-
lice officers to engage in lawful conduct, and that it generally did not punish of-
ficers who engaged in unlawful conduct. The complaint then alleged that these
practices caused the defendant police officers to engage in the misconduct which
was the subject of the suit. Id. at 1096-97.
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cient to state a cause of action under a civil rights statute. 18 The
court required the plaintiff to provide specifics upon which the
judge could weigh the substance of the claim by saying, "there is
no allegation that Officers Frazier or Stroud previously engaged in
misconduct but were not disciplined because of the alleged policy
of the City." 319 However, ordinary Victims cannot provide that in-
formation without discovery.
By contrast, in Means v. City of Chicago,3 20 'the court denied a
motion to dismiss a claim against a city because the liability of a
city must rest on the city's conduct, i.e., an official policy, custom
or practice which is "causally linked" to the conduct of the em-
ployee and resulting injury to the plaintiff.3 1 Since plaintiffs can-
not get full information about the inside policy or informal custom
of the police, the court did not impose a burden of pleading an
"affirmative link" between the occurrence of police misconduct and
the city's policy or custom.3
22
The La Plant decision poses two problems. First, it is ques-
tionable whether the plaintiff should bear the burden of pleading
the city's policy or custom and the "affirmative link." Even if the
plaintiff had the burden of production at trial, the plaintiff might
have met the initial burden by pleading the "casual link." Second,
it is questionable whether the defendant met the burden of persua-
sion in the motion. Since the defendant can escape discovery and
other proceedings, the court should have affirmative reasons for
granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
In La Plant, the court disposed of the claim in the D context.
However, the court could have treated it in the F context. The test
should be whether the burden of pleading the related element is
placed on the plaintiff. Accordingly, in a factual interception con-
text, the real test is not the Conley standard, but the question of
the burden of pleading, and the burden of the movant. At the
least, this question might be more clearly treated than the degree
318. See also, e.g., Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 875
(4th Cir. 1989)(observing that the pleader's allegations of a municipal policy of
inadequate training were asserted entirely as legal conclusions).
319. La Plant, 564 F. Supp. at 1098.
320. 535 F. Supp. 455 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
321. Id. at 462 (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-76 (1976)). In
Means, the court observed that it may be difficult to demonstrate that the city's
conduct was a proximate cause of the injury where there is an intervening inten-
tional act by another party. Id.
322. Id.
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of specificity.
4. Reasonable Inferences and No Duty of Conjuration
In the C, D, E and F contexts, all well-pleaded facts are taken
as true for purposes of the motion, and all reasonable inferences
are drawn in favor of the pleader. Although the facts must be sup-
plemented by such reasonable inferences as may be drawn in
plaintiff's favor,3" it is sometimes difficult for the courts to supple-
ment such reasonable inferences, because the court does not have
to conjure up unpleaded facts to turn a frivolous claim into a sub-
stantial one.32
Generally, in the C and E contexts, the court does not have to
conjure up unpleaded facts.32 5 Also, when drawing a reasonable in-
ference requires a leap in logic, the court does not have to conjure
up unpleaded facts.2 By contrast, when drawing a reasonable in-
ference does not require a leap in logic, the court should use rea-
sonable inferences.2 7 Thus, in the D and F contexts, the court
should avoid elimination of the case by using reasonable inferences
as much as possible. For example, if a plaintiff asserts an impor-
tant essential element such as "negligence," "defectiveness," or
"outrageous abuse," other elements such as "causality" may be
supplemented, even if the other elements are essential elements
323. See supra note 66.
324. See, e.g., Gooley v. Mobil Oil Co., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (lst Cir. 1988)
("[Tihe court need not conjure up unpled allegations or contrive elaborately ar-
cane scripts in order to carry the blushing bride through the portal.").
325. See, e.g., Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 58 (1st Cir.
1990) (the court is not obligated to every conceivable inference); Gray v. New
England Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 256 (1st Cir. 1986) (unreasonable and speculative
inferences cannot be allowed to bottom a civil rights action).
326. See, e.g., Caldwell v. City of Elwood, 959 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1992)
(stating that drawing a reasonable inference that a municipal custom or policy
exists when he has only pled one incident of alleged retaliation for speech on
matters of public concern requires a leap in logic that we are unwilling to take);
Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 873 F.2d 1357, 1361 (10th
Cir. 1989) (case dismissed because the plaintiff failed to allege any facts which
would support an inference that the alleged actions by gas transmission compa-
nies would be contrary to their economic interests absent an agreement).
327. See, e.g., The Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 16
(1st Cir. 1989) ("It is only when such conclusions are logically compelled, or at
least supported, by the stated facts, that is, when the suggested inference rises to
what experience indicates is an acceptable level of probability, that 'conclusions'
become 'facts' for pleading purposes.").
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under the substantive laws. Accordingly, the first test is whether
making the inferences requires a leap in logic or not.
However, even in the D context, the court does not have to use
reasonable inferences regarding the basic nature of the suit. Since
reasonable inferences may be used to gain insight into what plain-
tiffs are basically talking about,3 28 the court does not have to con-
jure up facts concerning the basic nature of the case. Also, when a
plaintiff does not suggest factors supporting an important or mate-
rial element, the court cannot use reasonable inferences.32 9 The
second test then is whether the plaintiff suggests some supporting
factors or not.
Finally, Rule 8(f) discourages requiring technical precision or
refined inferences and requires a fair effort to understand what the
plaintiff attempts to set forth. 3 0 Reasonable inferences must be
drawn from the documents submitted by plaintiffs at the pleading
stage.331 Thus, the third test is whether the court examined all the
documents submitted by plaintiffs at the pleading stage.
328. The courts have used nothing from these sources to contradict the fac-
tual allegations in the plaintiff's complaint or the reasonable inferences implied
by those allegations, but have used the sources merely to give insight into what
the plaintiff was talking about. See, e.g., Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745
F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984); Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434 (7th Cir. 1990).
329. See, e.g., Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437
(6th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff failed to allege, directly or inferentially, any facts in sup-
port of the material element of the cause of action and merely stated that she was
wrongfully discharged by the defendant in violation of the law); Semegen v. Weid-
ner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Plaintiffs have done nothing more than
set forth conclusory allegations of fraud, conspiracy to commit securities fraud,
and aiding and abetting in securities fraud, punctuated by a handful of neutral
facts.").
330. DeLoach v. Crowley's, Inc., 128 F.2d 378, 380 (5th Cir. 1942).
331. FED. R. Civ. P. 10(c) ("a copy of any written instrument which is an
exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes"). See, e.g., United States v.
Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 1582 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that the court may take into
consideration documents incorporated by reference to the pleadings) (citing
Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1065-66 (2d Cir. 1985)); Gillihan v. Shillinger,
872 F.2d 935, 940 (10th Cir. 1989) (an inmate brought a civil rights action against
prison officials; although the plaintiff did not expressly allege that the deprivation
of his prison account funds was the result of an established state procedure, his
allegations suggested that the deprivation was not the result of a random and
unauthorized act, but an established policy, and the exhibits attached to the com-
plaint supported this suggestion); Durning v First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265,
1267 (9th Cir. 1987).
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5. Defendant's Knowledge or Intent
This sub-part examines how to deal with defendant's knowl-
edge or intent. Even when plaintiff has the burden of producing
evidence to prove defendant's knowledge or intent, the plaintiff
should not necessarily have the burden of pleading the particular-
ized allegations. However, many courts have assumed that plain-
tiffs owe the burden of pleading certain inside information of de-
fendants. Indeed, many courts have paid great attention to
"conclusory" allegations about defendants' knowledge or intent.33 2
In addition, it is questionable whether the courts have properly
used reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs.
Highly factual and subjective questions of intent and purpose
should be resolved after discovery and trial.33 3 Especially in cases
of corporate fraud, where the plaintiff cannot be expected to have
personal knowledge of the detail of internal corporate affairs, rigid
application of special pleading could permit sophisticated defraud-
ers to escape liability.3 4 Even Rule 9(b) allows "malice, intent,
knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person" to be averred
generally.3 5 Accordingly, in any case, pleading of malice, intent,
knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person should not be
an essential element whose burden of pleading is imposed on plain-
tiffs. Instead, plaintiffs should be allowed to allege such elements
in a general or conclusory fashion. 36 In other words, the court
should not dispose of a claim because of a failure to state malice,
intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person in the
D context.
Nevertheless, the courts sometimes put the burden of pleading
defendant's knowledge or intent in the D context on plaintiffs. For
example, in Ross v. A. H. Robins Co.,"' the Second Circuit found
332. Marcus, supra note 12, at 448. Cf. JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, §3.1, at
140.
333. Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir.
1984)(citing Havoco of Amer. v. Shell Oil Co., 626 F.2d 549, 553 (7th Cir. 1980)).
334. In re Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 890 F.2d 628, 645 (3d Cir. 1989).
335. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
336. See, e.g., American Technical Mach. Corp. v. Masterpiece Enter., Inc.,
235 F. Supp. 917 (M.D. Pa. 1964) (observing that all that is usually required in
the complaint is a generalized statement of the facts from which the defendant
may form a responsive pleading; thus, if a bona fide complaint is filed that
charges every element necessary to recover, summary dismissal for failure to set
out evidential facts is not justified).
337. 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979).
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that the complaint failed to "specifically plead those events which
they assert give rise to a strong inference" that the defendants
knew and recklessly disregarded the health risk of an intrauterine
device.338 Thus, the non movant seems to bear the burden of per-
suasion as well as the burden of pleading relevant facts to show the
strong inferences.
However, defendant's knowledge or intent may be viewed as
insufficient in the E context. For example, in Hiland Dairy, Inc. v.
Kroger Co., 39 the court affirmed dismissal of a complaint, holding
that the mere construction of a processing plant by Kroger did not
constitute an attempt to create a monopoly in violation of the
Sherman Act.340 The movant could show that the mere construc-
tion of the plant was a highly improbable way of establishing an
attempt to monopolize. "1
Reasonable inferences should be used as much as possible in
light of the Conley standard. A plaintiff should not be thrown out
of court for failing to plead facts in support of every arcane ele-
ment of his claim.3 42 Especially in civil rights cases,3 43 a plaintiff is
not required to provide either proof of the claim or proffer all
available evidence, because much of the evidence can be developed
only through discovery. The court should use reasonable inferences
regarding the defendant's knowledge or intention, and the plaintiff
should be allowed to allege those matters with only a few conceiva-
ble facts or very general terms.3"
338. Id. at 558.
339. 402 F.2d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969).
340. Id.
341. Id. Similarly, in Havoco of Am. v. Shell Oil Co., 626 F.2d 549 (7th Cir.
1980), the court affirmed the dismissal because defendant's conspiracy could not
be established only by the fact that the defendant did not acquire a company, and
after that the plaintiff lost a single contract with a subsidiary of the company.342. See, e.g., E.J. v. Hamilton County 707 F. Supp. 314, 316 (S.D. Ohio
1989) ("A plaintiff will not be thrown out of court for failing to plead facts in
support of every arcane element of his claim.").
343. See, e.g., Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 666 (3d Cir.
1988); Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir.
1988) ("We are not holding the pleader to an impossibly high standard; we recog-
nize the policies behind Rule 8 and the concept of notice pleading."); Marcus,
supra note 13, at 468-471.
344. See, e.g., American Technical Mach. Corp. v. Masterpiece Enter., Inc.,
235 F. Supp. 917 (M.D. Pa. 1964). In American Technical, the court was satisfied
that the complaint charging a defendant with knowingly inducing and conspiring
with another defendant to infringe the patent was a sufficient foundation upon
which further proof may be offered to show that he was organizer, president and
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In order to reconcile the Conley standard and the necessity of
essential elements, the court should distinguish the burden of pro-
duction and the burden of pleading. One desirable course to re-
solve this problem is to release plaintiff from the burden of plead-
ing defendant's knowledge or intent. In other words, a plaintiff
may have the burden of production regarding the defendant's
knowledge or intent after discovery or amendments of pleadings,
but he does not necessarily have the burden of pleading it. This
modification can be made on the procedural law level. If "knowl-
edge" or "intent" is broadly recognized as a matter of substantive
law, it may be easier to allege the relevant facts. This resolution
must be effected on the substantive law level. Under the substan-
tive law that intent is not limited to consequences which are de-
sired, for example, if the actor knows that the consequences are
certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act and still goes
ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to pro-
duce the result.3
45
III. OPERATION OF RULE 12(B)(6)
It is generally said that the court has broad discretion in rul-
ing on a motion to dismiss.4 6 In order to clarify the functions of
Rule 12(b)(6), we must clarify the scope of the court's discretion,
as well as the standard for dismissal of a complaint. After examin-
ing the general Rule 12(b)(6) procedure, this part will examine how
Rule 12(b)(6) proceedings affect settlement practice, whether dis-
missal sua sponte should be allowed in any case, and whether a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be granted in a case in which the
dominant spirit of an infringing company or that he otherwise acted as the mov-
ing, active, conscious force behind an infringement. Id. at 918-19. See also, Gomez
v. Pima County, 426 F. Supp. 816 (D. Ariz. 1976) (denying a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
because two specific alleged incidents provided reasonable evidence that the de-
fendant's officials had "discriminatory purpose"). In Gomez, the plaintiff's statis-
tics showed a very low percentage of Mexican-American employees of the sheriff's
department and a pervasive pattern of discrimination in employment. Id. at 820.
345. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 8A cmt. (1977); See also,
Boudeloche v. Grow Chem. Coatings Corp., 728 F.2d 759, 761 (5th Cir. 1984) (re-
versing the dismissal because an employee's complaint which alleged that his su-
pervisor ordered him to continue painting interior of tank despite fact that em-
ployee was made ill by toxic fumes, thus resulting in severe damage to his body
was sufficient to state claim under "intentional act" exception to a state Work-
men's Compensation statute).
346. See, e.g., International Bank of Miami v. Banco de Economias y
Prestamos, 55 F.R.D. 180, 185 (D.P.R. 1972).
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claim exists but the desired remedy is not available.
A. Scope of Discretion and General Procedure
What kind of discretion does the court have under Rule
12(b)(6)? Liberal pleading standards give the courts discretion in
deciding when a complaint is formally insufficient and whether to
permit leave to replead. 3"7 Accordingly, the district court has dis-
cretion to postpone deciding a motion to dismiss until some later
stage in the proceeding, 4 ' or to grant the motion to dismiss with
leave to amend the complaint. "9 In most cases, the action will be
expected to continue into the discovery stage, and determination
of the legal sufficiency of a claim will be postponed until that stage
is sufficiently completed.5 0
If the court has too much discretion in using Rule 12(b)(6),
this may lead to increased uncertainty in the proceeding. A typical
answer to the question of a Rule 12(b)(6) standard might be that
"the line between the totally unmeritorious claims and the others
cannot be drawn by scientific instruments but must be carved out
case by case by the sound judgment of trial judges."3 51 That is why
some commentators conclude that flexible use of summary judg-
ment combined with selective cost-shifting through Rule 11 would
provide a better system of pretrial management. 52 Certainly, sum-
mary judgment will serve a useful function in disposing of certain
cases. Because the Supreme Court's 1986 trilogy of summary judg-
ment opinions encouraged the use of summary judgments, 53 the
courts do not have to use Rule 12(b)(6) to escape the difficulty of
using summary judgments. Also, Rule 11 can play a significant role
in protecting defendants and judicial resources from unmeritorious
cases. However, these are not adequate responses to the confusion
347. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1357, at 303-04. Discretion is
viewed as "considerable leeway under the liberal pleading standards." Id.
348. Id. at 359.
349. See, e.g., Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 43 (2d Cir. 1988); Moran
Towing Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 204 F. Supp. 353 (D.R.I. 1962).
See also infra part IV-B.
350. JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, §3.6, at 148.
351. Rennie & Laughlin, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 242 F.2d 208, 213 (9th Cir.
1957).
352. Marcus, supra note 12, at 437; Louis, supra note 17, at 1041.
353. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
180 [Vol. 15:119
62
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol15/iss2/1
FUNCTIONS OF RULE 12(B)(6)
in Rule 12(b)(6). The motion serves quite different functions by
allowing elimination of cases at the pleading stage and even before
discovery. In order to streamline civil procedure and make it con-
sistent with justice, the operation of Rule 12(b)(6) must become
clearer.
First, "discretion" generally has two meanings. One meaning
suggests that there is no wrong response to the issues presented.
The other suggests that the trial judge has a right to be wrong
without incurring reversal."' If the former meaning of discretion is
accepted, the court may decide to postpone the dismissal to an-
other stage, permit leave to replead, or dismiss the case without
prejudice in a Rule 12(b)(6) proceeding.3 5 However, the court may
abuse its discretion in denying a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 351 or dis-
missing a claim with prejudice.3 57 If the latter meaning of discre-
tion is accepted, the court has no discretion to dismiss a complaint
that it decides is formally sufficient or insufficient. Rather, the
court must follow particular standards and procedural rules.3 58 Be-
cause a Rule 12(b)(6) motion raises only an issue of law, 59 the ap-
pellate court reviews de novo a district court's interpretation and
its dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).36 °
354. Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed
Form Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 637 (1971).
355. See, e.g., Beenken v. Chicago & N.W. R.R. Co., 367 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D.
Iowa 1973) ("In general, the court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion to
dismiss... but dismissal should only be granted with care in order to avoid im-
properly denying plaintiff the opportunity to have his claim adjudicated on the
merits.").
356. See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Beaumont Police Dep't, 958 F.2d 616 (5th
Cir. 1992) (reversing the district court's denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because
the plaintiffs did not meet heightened pleading requirement under §1983).
357. See, e.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't., 901 F.2d 696, 701-02 (9th
Cir. 1990) (finding that "the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the
claim with prejudice"); but see Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 415 (9th
Cir. 1985) ("The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that ap-
pellants' complaints, [which] exceeded 70 pages in length, were confusing and
conclusory and not in compliance with Rule 8.").
358. See, e.g., Mescall v. Burrus, 603 F.2d 1266, 1269 (7th Cir. 1979) ("[T]he
trial court did not strictly observe the limits of its discretion in allowing the mo-
tion to dismiss.").
359. See, e.g., Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 1989) ("We
review the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint de novo, since the suf-
ficiency of a complaint is a question of law.").
360. See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225 (1991) (holding that a
court of appeals should review de novo a district court's determination of state
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Second, an issue of law includes substantive law and technical
or procedural law issues.36 The substantive law issue is whether or
not the claim is legally sustained in the A and B contexts. Assum-
ing that the claim may be legally sustained, the procedural issue is
whether the statement of a claim is sufficient or defective in the C
to G contexts. In any context, if a claim is stated insufficiently or
defectively, the complaint may be dismissed with or without leave
to amend. Accordingly, the standards of Rule 12(b)(6) will be ap-
plied when the court decides the complaint is formally insufficient
or defective in each context.
Based upon the foregoing, Rule 12(b)(6) works as follows: a
complaint states a claim sufficiently or it does not; if the complaint
is fatally insufficient or defective, it remains so when reviewed by
court of appeals or the Supreme Court, even though an evidentiary
hearing may produce additional information; and if a district court
ignores insufficient allegations, Rule 12(b)(6) then grants discretion
-to waive the decision to dismiss the claim, and exercise of that dis-
cretion may be essentially unreviewable.
62
B. Effects on Settlement Practice
It has been said that Rule 12(b)(6) affects settlement dynam-
ics. Professor Marcus analyzed decisions along lines of the debate
between the "public interest" model and the "dispute resolution"
model of litigation. According to Professor Marcus, while the "pub-
lic interest" model seems to favor pretrial disposition, dismissal on
the pleading under the "dispute resolution" model would arguably
not be a desirable alternative. 63 He argues that, under the "dis-
pute resolution" model, less use of Rule 12(b)(6) facilitates a desir-
able settlement. However, it is questionable whether less use or
even elimination of the current Rule 12(b)(6) would facilitate
settlements.
Litigation has both public interest and dispute resolution
functions. The public interest model derives from the public or
law); Caldwell v. City of Elwood, 959 F.2d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1992); Marcus, supra
note 13, at 480 ("[Alny dismissal for failure to state a claim is subject to full
review.").
361. A legal controversy consists of issues of fact and issues of law. JAMES ET
AL., supra note 18, §3.1, at 139. However, under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must not
decide issues of fact.
362. Cf. Roberts, supra note 9, at 414.
363. Marcus, supra note 12, at 455-56.
[Vol. 15:119
64
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol15/iss2/1
FUNCTIONS OF RULE 12(B)(6)
court's viewpoint, and the dispute resolution model derives from
the parties' viewpoints. They must be concurrently considered.
Similarly, Rule 12(b)(6) is connected with "public interest," and
the notice pleading theory is connected with "dispute resolution"
interest. Even under the "dispute resolution" model, dismissal on
the pleading may be a desirable alternative in certain cases such as
"strike suits. '364 Therefore, we cannot conclude that dismissal on
the pleadings would always be an undesirable alternative, given the
"dispute resolution" model.
Although optimal justice may usually be found somewhere be-
tween the polar positions of the litigants,8 " the court should make
efforts to pursue the best resolution in each particular case. Some-
times pretrial disposition may be the best way to resolve a case;
and strict standards to achieve fewer dismissals under Rule
12(b)(6) will not always facilitate desirable settlements.
Rather, a clear standard for operation of Rule 12(b)(6) may
facilitate settlement, because each party can recognize the other
party's positions and relative strengths. Since a full complaint
helps educate the defendant about his potential exposure in the
litigation, some pleading requirements facilitate the parties' prepa-
ration for settlement negotiations. 66 Winning a motion to dismiss
will generally work in favor of the movant for settlement purposes.
However, particularly in the C and D contexts, the non-movant
may be able to file an amended complaint with more detailed alle-
gations, and require the movant to answer these allegations. If a
defendant is substantively weak, a dismissal decision does not nec-
essarily work against the plaintiff who is substantively entitled to a
claim. Thus, Rule 12(b)(6) proceedings will give the parties a good
opportunity to consider and reach a fair settlement. Rule 12(b)(6)
can appropriately affect settlement dynamics if the rule is applied
according to clear standards.
C. Dismissal Sua Sponte
The court on its own initiative may dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a claim as long as the procedure employed is fair,
while "strict rules" must be applied against the dismissal of an ac-
tion sua sponte.117 However, given the adversary system, courts
364. Cf. JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, § 3.6, at 148-149.
365. Marcus, supra note 12, at 455.
366.. Cf. SHR.VE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 2, § 54, at 216.
367. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1357, at 301.
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should act on their own motion sparingly. 68 In Doe v. St. Joseph's
Hospital,69 the court stated, sua sponte dismissals "conflict with
the traditional adversarial concepts of justice to the extent that
they make the district court 'a proponent rather than an indepen-
dent entity.' ",, Also, dismissal sua sponte may prejudice plain-
tiffs by depriving them of an opportunity to amend their
complaint. 37 1
In light of the objectives of Rule 12(b)(6), the court should
have the power to use dismissal sua sponte, insofar as it does not
unfairly harm adversarial precepts. Since Rule 12(b)(6) is designed
to protect some public interests, the court should be allowed some
supervising power over the parties. However, when some argument
is necessary for a decision, dismissal sua sponte will not be
appropriate.
If the court may use dismissal sua sponte, how does the court
decide the "fairness" in the procedure, i.e. what are the rules? In
order to prevent arbitrary use of Rule 12(b)(6), the court should be
allowed to use dismissal sua sponte only under certain strict rules.
The "strict rules" should exist on both the procedural level and
the substantive level.
1. Strict Rules on the Procedural Level
The court should not use dismissal sua sponte without al-
lowing a plaintiff an opportunity to be heard.37 2 In Tingler v. Mar-
shall, 75 the Sixth Circuit ruled that before a complaint may be
dismissed sua sponte, the court must require: (1) service of the
complaint on defendants, (2) notice of the court's intent to dismiss
the complaint, (3) an opportunity for plaintiff to amend his com-
368. The Supreme Court expressly declined to rule on the propriety of sua
sponte dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) in Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329
n.8 (1989).
369. 788 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1986).
370. Id. at 415 (quoting Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109, 1111 (6th Cir.
1983).
371. Id. (pointing out that a dismissal of a complaint before service will deny
the plaintiff the right to amend the complaint once as a matter of course under
Rule 15(a)).
372. See, e.g., Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1991); Bayron v.
Trudeau, 702 F.2d 43, 45-6 (2d Cir. 1983) (reversing and remanding sua sponte
dismissals of pro se civil rights complaint prior to requiring the defendants to
answer).
373. 716 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1983).
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plaint or respond to the reasons stated by the district court in its
notice of intended sua sponte dismissal, (4) an opportunity for de-
fendant to respond or file an answer or motions, and (5) a state-
ment of the reasons for dismissal. 74 Although (1) and (4) among
these requirements may be omitted,7 5 other procedural require-
ments seem to be indispensable to protect plaintiffs' interests.
Some courts do not require such strict procedural rules. For
example, the Eighth Circuit held that failure to give a plaintiff
prior notice and opportunity to respond before dismissal sua
sponte was not reversible error when it was patently obvious that
the plaintiff could not prevail based on facts alleged in the com-
plaint.7 6 This rule is considered by some courts practical and fully
consistent with plaintiff's rights and the efficient use of judicial re-
sources. 77 However, this position may not only harm the adver-
sarial process, but also render the strict rules for sua sponte mo-
tions meaningless. It is necessary to confirm by the strict rules
whether it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not prevail
based on facts alleged in the complaint.7 8 Accordingly, failure to
comply with the strict rules should be reversible error.379 Unless it
is reversible error, the court may have discretion to refuse to com-
ply with strict procedural rules. When a proposed amendment to
374. Id. at 1112.
375. See, e.g., Morrison v. Tomano, 755 F.2d 515, 517 (6th Cir. 1985) ("sua
sponte dismissal is not necessarily rendered invalid because of lack of service on
defendant or failure to provide defendant an opportunity to respond").
376. Smith v. Boyd, 945 F.2d 1041, 1043 (8th Cir. 1991); See also, Baker v.
Director United States Parole Comm'n, 916 F.2d 725, 726-27 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per
curiam); Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d. 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987); and
McKinney v. Oklahoma Dept. of Human Serv., 925 F.2d. 363, 365 (10th Cir.
1991).
377. See, e.g., Baker v. Director United States Parole Comm'n, 916 F.2d 725,
726 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
378. In Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), the Supreme Court pointed
out that notice of a pending motion alerts plaintiff to the legal theory underlying
the defendant's challenge, and enables him meaningfully to respond by opposing
the motion to dismiss on legal grounds or by clarifying his factual allegations so as
to conform with the requirements of a valid cause of action. This adversarial pro-
cess also crystallizes the pertinent issues and facilitates appellate review by creat-
ing a more complete record of the case. Id. at 329-30.
379. See, e.g., Perez v. Ortiz, 849 F.2d 793, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1988); Morrison v.
Tomano, 755 F.2d 515, 516-17 (6th Cir. 1985); Jefferson Fourteenth Assoc. v.
Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc., 695 F.2d 524, 526-27 (11th Cir. 1983); Cf. Litera-
ture, Inc. v. Quinn, 482 F.2d 372, 374 (1st Cir. 1973)(failure to give plaintiff prior
notice "might well justify reversal," but reversed on other grounds).
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the complaint fails to state a claim, the court of appeals might de-
cline to reverse a dismissal because a remand would be obviously
futile.380
2. Strict Rules on the Substantive Level
Since dismissal at the pleading stage on the merits may seri-
ously affect the plaintiffs' interests, the court should not dismiss
sua sponte in cases involving questions about sufficiency of factual
statements in the D to F contexts. In particular, in settlement
practice, when the court dismisses a claim for whatever reason, the
defendant is unfairly advantaged. Accordingly, the court must con-
sider what impact such a decision would have on the parties.
Despite the need for "strict rules" for making motions sua
spon te, some courts are not so strict. Nor have the courts
presented adequately clear standards for dismissal sua sponte. The
Seventh Circuit, for example, permits sua sponte dismissals based
on Rule 12(b)(6) as long as a "sufficient basis" for the court's ac-
tion is "apparent" from the plaintiff's pleading. 381 Although this
standard seems to restrict the use of dismissal sua sponte, it is
actually not different from the general standard for the defend-
ant's motion.3 82 Such a standard allows for uncertainty as to
whether a sufficient basis for the court's action is apparent or not.
Accordingly, some instances where sua sponte dismissal can be al-
lowed should be clarified. The court should use dismissal sua
sponte only when there is no doubt that the complaint should be
dismissed.
This does not mean that the courts should refrain from using
the dismissal sua sponte in a general sense. If the court has no
discretion in certain situations, the court is forced to justify using
380. See, e.g., Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1073 (7th Cir. 1987).
381. See, e.g., Apostol v. Landau, 957 F.2d 339, 343 (7th Cir. 1992); Shockley
v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987); Tamari v. Bache & Co., 565 F.2d 1194,
1198 (7th Cir. 1977).
382. In Apostol, the Seventh Circuit explains that, in evaluating the propri-
ety of a sua sponte dismissal, they take the allegations in the complaint to be true
and view them, along with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and that the claim should be dismissed
only if it appears beyond doubt that he is unable to prove any set of facts that
would entitle him to relief. Apostol, 957 F.2d, at 343, (citing Ellsworth v. City of
Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 184 (7th Cir. 1985)). However, in Ellsworth, the court only
held that the district court properly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6). Ellsworth, 774 F.2d at 186.
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it. In this regard, if a Rule 12(b)(6) motion gives rise to an auto-
matic application of substantive law to bar a claim in the A con-
text, the court has no discretion to dismiss a complaint when it
decides it is legally defective. In such cases, the court can easily
use dismissal sua sponte, and the dismissal for failure to state a
claim will be subject to full review at an earlier stage.3 8 Also, when
some defendants file a Rule 12(b)(6) motion but others do not, the
court may use sua sponte dismissal for the defendants who do not
file the motion.
For example, in Raitport v. Chemical Bank,3 8" the court
granted dismissal sua sponte when the plaintiff, a self-styled en-
trepreneur and inventor, sued fifty-eight banks and several hun-
dred unnamed foundations mainly because each defendant refused
to loan money to the plaintiff.3 85 The court dismissed the case be-
cause there were no facts, however favorably viewed, that sup-
ported his cause of action, and because the claims were barred by
collateral estoppel.3 86 In this case, since some defendants filed a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion and others did not, the court could not avoid
use of dismissal sua sponte for non-movant defendants in order to
dismiss the case entirely.
On the other hand, when a case involves questions about the
sufficiency of factual statements in the D to F contexts, the court
does not have to use dismissal sua sponte. Rather, the court
should avoid using it unilaterally in favor of defendants without
their motion. For example, in Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon)
S.A.L. ,387 the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal sua sponte when
the plaintiff alleged that an agreement was induced by fraud and
coercion which rendered an arbitration agreement invalid.388 The
court dismissed the case because the conclusionary and general al-
legations regarding fraud and coercion were insufficient. 89 Proba-
bly, since the plaintiff did not allege any particularized facts to
support fraud or coercion, the court could have granted the motion
to dismiss if the defendant had filed the motion. But the defend-
ant not file the motion. More importantly, the court appears to
have decided that the agreement was not induced by fraud or coer-
383. Marcus, supra note 12, at 480.
384. 74 F.R.D. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. 565 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978).
388. Id.
389. Id.
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cion. Since the court used Rule 12(b)(6) on its own initiative, there
was no need for the defendant as a movant to meet the burden of
showing that the statement of a claim was general or conclusory, or
highly improbable. The plaintiff should have been given an oppor-
tunity to argue.
Similarly, when a case involves a dispute over an interpreta-
tion of law in the B context, the court should refrain from using
dismissal sua sponte. Although a dismissal for failure to state a
claim may be subject to full review at an earlier stage,390 it is not
appropriate to force plaintiffs out of court and reward defendants
in settlement practice. Since the court should be disinterested in a
dispute, it should avoid using its discretion unless defendants file
the motion and both parties are allowed to argue.
Accordingly, the court should use dismissal sua sponte only
when there is no doubt that the complaint should be dismissed. In
other words, the court may grant dismissal sua sponte in the A or
C context, but should not use it in other contexts. If the courts are
reluctant to exercise the dismissal sua sponte, they can usually ac-
complish the same end by inviting the parties to file for the mo-
tion.3 91 However, such practice can be viewed as "de facto" dismis-
sal sua sponte, and the above approach may be applied to the
court's invitation.
D. Desired Remedy
Should a Rule 12(b)(6) motion be granted in a case in which a
claim exists but the desired remedy is not available? This is a
problem of the operation of Rule 12(b)(6) in the B context.
Under the modern pleading system, the demand for relief has
lost much of the significance it held at common law or in code
pleading. 92 The court may grant the relief to which the prevailing
party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in
his pleading.39 3 Accordingly, a plaintiff is entitled to a remedy not
390. Marcus, supra note 12, at 480.
391. Cf. SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 2, § 81, at 317.
392. See, e.g., Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G.(Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th
Cir. 1992) ("Common law pleading required the advocate to match facts to a legal
theory, the 'form of action.' "). Code pleading ended up in much the same place,
as courts read the code formula 'facts constituting a cause of action' to require the
pleader to state a legal theory." However, under the Federal Rules, "the com-
plaint need not identify a legal theory and specifying an incorrect theory is no
fatal.").
393. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c); SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 2, § 49, at
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only on the stated grounds, but also on unstated grounds, which
must be examined in .the B context. For example, in Electrical
Construction & Maintenance Co. v. Maeda Pacific Corp.,394 the
Ninth Circuit declined to consider whether the trial court erred in
foreclosing relief on a promissory estoppel theory because the
plaintiff did not plead this theory and because the trial court did
not consider it.395 However, the Ninth Circuit permitted assertion
of a promissory estoppel claim at the time of trial, even if not spe-
cifically alleged in the complaint, because the basis for the promis-
sory estoppel claim arose out of the same facts as the breach of
contract claim.3 9 Similarly, in Dopico v. Goldschmidt,39 when the
plaintiffs could not obtain the massive relief they sought involving
extraordinary expenditures, the court denied a motion to dismiss
as well as summary judgment. As the court put it, "the extreme
result of dismissing the claim would be proper only if plaintiffs
would not be entitled to any relief, even if they were to prevail on
the merits. ' '38
In practice, courts are generally reluctant to dispose of the
complaint on technical grounds in view of the policy of the federal
rules to determine actions on their merits.3 99 Since there is no re-
quirement of selection of remedies in the complaint, 00 the courts
do not have to pinpoint the remedies. As long as we accept these
propositions, the Dopico position is correct.
However, in certain cases, the court may dismiss a case when
some claim probably exists but the desired remedy is not available.
First, the plaintiff can limit the scope of remedies. Theoretically,
some may argue that the plaintiff might have wanted only the
massive relief in Dopico. Clearly, if a plaintiff wanted some relief
in a claim similar in nature, the court should not dismiss the entire
case because the claim is only partially granted. However, if the
plaintiff wanted alternative relief different in nature from the orig-
inal claim, they could have specified the alternative claim. 0 1 Since
the courts should not waste their resources on claims which the
195.
394. 764 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1985).
395. Id.
396. Id. at 623.
397. 687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982).
398. Id. at 649.
399. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1357, at 323-24.
400. WRIGHT, supra note 55, § 68, at 442.
401. FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a).
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plaintiffs do not seek, they might be correct in dismissing the
claims. In this position, the Dopico court could have granted the
motion to dismiss.However, it may be difficult for the court to dis-
tinguish differences of nature and differences of quantity. Thus,
courts have held that a complaint should not be dismissed for legal
insufficiency except where a plaintiff fails to state a claim on which
some relief, not limited by the request in the complaint, can be
granted.02 Accordingly, when a plaintiff requests limited relief, the
court may grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion even if the desired remedy
is not available.
Second, when the plaintiff cannot obtain the relief in a federal
jurisdiction but may have a claim in a state jurisdiction, the fed-
eral court may dismiss the case. For example, in Car Carriers, Inc.
v. Ford Motor Co.,40 3 the Seventh Circuit granted a motion to dis-
miss when some claims for breach of contract might have been
granted under the state laws but the desired remedy as provided
by the Sherman Act was not available.140 In that case, the federal
court did not have to review other state claims. 0 5
Third, some courts grant a motion to dismiss a claim for spe-
cific damages, with leave to file an amended complaint. For exam-
ple, in Moran Towing Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co., s0 6 the plaintiff, a subcontractor, had no remedy against a
surety on a Miller Act bond for the recovery of damages caused by
the negligence of the prime contractor, but the plaintiff could
maintain an action against the surety on such a bond when the
claim asserted was for the value of labor and materials fur-
nished.07 Although the plaintiff alleged it furnished labor and
materials pursuant to the contract, 0 8 the court granted the motion
to dismiss with leave to file an amended complaint.0 9
402. See, e.g., Doe v. United States Dep't of Justice, 757 F.2d 1092, 1104
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
403. 745 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1054 (1985).
404. Id.
405. Id. at 1105. Similarly, in Packer v. Yampol, 630 F. Supp. 1237 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), when shareholders sued the corporation's board of directors asserting viola-
tions of federal securities laws as well as various common law violations, the court
dismissed the case by holding that the shareholders lacked standing in that they
failed to allege requisite damage or injury and that the court could not exercise
pendent jurisdiction over the derivative state law claims. Id.
406. F. Supp. 353 (D.R.I. 1962).
407. Id. at 356.
408. Id. at 355.
409. Id. at 356.
[Vol. 15:119'
72
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol15/iss2/1
FUNCTIONS OF RULE 12(B)(6)
The first exception is based on the pleaders' intent, and the
second on the limit of jurisdiction. The third exception is question-
able because it is not clear why the court dismisses the case if they
plan to allow amendment. In Moran Towing Corp., the court
stated, "[I]n passing upon a motion such as this, it is not for me to
speculate as to the nature or the sufficiency of the proof which the
plaintiff may present in support of its claim."'41 0 The nature or the
sufficiency of the proof is irrelevant to Rule 12(b)(6) proceedings,
and the court should have reasonable inferences to deny the
motion.
No substantial harm may result from a dismissal with leave to
amend, because the pleader will not lose the right to file an
amended complaint and the dismissal does not have res judicata
effect, as long as there is no statute of limitations problem. How-
ever, the plaintiff may not be able to appeal the dismissal, because
such an order is normally interlocutory.4 Also, the plaintiff may
be barred from filing an amended complaint by a statute of limita-
tions. Since the dismissal with leave to amend is often based on
some technicalities, the court should use a pretrial order or other
device unless such a dismissal is substantially needed.
IV. EFFECTS OF RULE 12(B)(6) DECISIONS
A. Res Judicata
A number of courts have indicated that a dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) will be treated as a judgment on the merits, unless the
court specifies that it is without prejudice."' Thus, a dismissal de-
cision essentially has the effect of invoking the principles of res
judicata." 3 However, it is not clear precisely what effect the appli-
cation of res judicata has.41 '
Res judicata law has long consisted of "claim preclusion" and
410. Id.
411. See infra part IV-C.
412. See, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399, n.3
(1981); Hart v. Yamaha-Parts Distrib., Inc., 787 F.2d 1468, 1470 (11th Cir. 1986);
See also, FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 11, § 14.7, at 654.
413. See, e.g., Winslow v. Walters, 815 F.2d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir. 1987) (stat-
ing that a ruling under Rule 12(b)(6) is a decision on the merits with full res
judicata effect); 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, 1357, at 367; 2A MOORE &
LUCAS, supra note 25, at 12-103.
414. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, 1357, at 369.
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"issue preclusion.14 15 The essential concept of the modern rule of
claim preclusion is that a final judgment precludes the same par-
ties and those closely related to them from relitigating the same or
a sufficiently similar claim in a subsequent lawsuit when the proce-
dure in the first action afforded plaintiff a fair opportunity to get
to the merits.4 16 The basic rule of issue preclusion is that a final
judgment precludes relitigation of the same issue of fact or law.417
The doctrine applies so long as (1) the issue was actually litigated,
determined, and necessary to the judgment in the prior adjudica-
tion, and (2) the circumstances of the particular case do not sug-
gest any reason why it would- be unfair to invoke the doctrine. 1 8
Today, the courts generally apply the claim preclusion doc-
trine to the judgment of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).'1 9 Also, the
courts often use specific language for issue preclusion in Rule
12(b)(6) decisions.42 0 Since the Federal Rules gave plaintiffs abun-
dant opportunities to develop all available pleading and evidence
by amendment, discovery or other devices in the first action, the
scope of what might have been litigated by the plaintiff in the first
action was enlarged. In general, the scope of claim preclusion
415. SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 2, § 106, at 418. However, some
courts do not seem to distinguish the two effects. See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. Hunt,
891 F.2d 1555, 1560 (11th Cir. 1990).
416. JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, §11.16, at 607.
417. Issue preclusion is applied to issues of law as well as fact, subject to
some special qualifications. JAMES ET AL., supra note 18, § 11.21, at 614.
418. SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 2, § 106, at 420.
419. See, e.g., Hall v. Tower Land & Inv. Co., 512 F.2d 481, 483 (5th Cir.
1975) (holding that suit was barred under doctrine of res judicata by dismissal of
complaint in prior action under Rule 12(b)(6), where both actions were brought
by same plaintiff against the same parties seeking the same remedy in regard to
same property, regardless of whether the theories pleaded in the two actions were
the,same); Teltronics Serv., Inc. v. L.M. Ericson Telecommunications, Inc., 642
F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the action was barred, by doctrine of res
judicata, by dismissal, for failure to state a claim, of a prior suit involving the
same parties, the same cause of action and the same facts). See also, 18 CHARLES
A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION, § 4339, at
354 (1981).
420. See, e.g., Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1105 (7th
Cir. 1984) (dismissing the claim under the Sherman Act "with prejudice" and the
remaining claims "without prejudice"). In this case, the court granted the motion
to dismiss because the claim under the Sherman Act was invalid, even though
some claims for breach of contract might be granted under the state laws. Since
the court did not review the other state claims, there was no res judicata effect on
the other claims. Id.
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should also'be enlarged.42
However, a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may occur before
discovery. Also, the allowance of an amendment after defendant's
answer lies within the discretion of the trial court."22 Since Rule
12(b)(6) motions decide only the legality of a claim or the suffi-
ciency of a statement of a claim, it is problematic whether every
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) has a full claim preclusion effect.
While it seems that each dismissal apparently has an issue preclu-
sion effect as long as the requirements are satisfied,'2 it is not
clear whether a Rule 12(b)(6) proceeding gives a plaintiff a fair op-
portunity to-get to the merits. Claim preclusion is obviously har-
sher to a plaintiff than issue preclusion, and claim preclusion
should be carefully examined.
1. Specific Language
At the threshold, it is necessary to clarify what generates the
res judicata effect. Some courts strongly suggest that district courts
should use the terms "with prejudice" or "without prejudice" only
when making a determination as to the res judicata effect of a dis-
missal. "2 ' The question then arises whether the court has the dis-
cretionary power to generate the res judicata effect by using spe-
cific language in the decision.42 5
The Sixth Circuit has held that, absent specific language to
the contrary by the district court, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion consti-
tutes an adjudication on the merits and further actions on the
same claim are barred. 26 If the specific language is the determina-
421. JAMES ET AL., supra note 20, §11.16, at 606.
422. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a); 3 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, 15.10, at
15-106.
423. In a Rule 12(b)(6) proceeding, the issue is ordinarily litigated and deter-
mined actually, and necessary to the judgment in the Rule 12(b)(6) proceeding.
The issue can be perceived in accordance with the categorization from the A to G
contexts. See 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 419, § 4439, at 354.
424. See, e.g., Elfenbein v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 590 F.2d 445, 449 (2d
Cir. 1978).
425. See, e.g., Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 495 (6th Cir.
1990) (the decision to dismiss with prejudice is a harsh sanction, but the choice
lies within the discretionary power of the district court); Holloway v. United
States, 734 F.2d 506, 508 (10th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Dynes v. Army Air Force
Exch. Serv., 720 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
426. See, e.g., Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 899 F.2d 485, 495 (6th
Cir. 1990); Shaw v. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp., 554 F.2d 786, 789 (6th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 852 (1977).
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tive factor as to whether the claim is barred by res judicata, the
plaintiff must appeal when the trial court fails to use the specific
language. The plaintiff may seek the specific language "without
prejudice" by appealing the decision which granted the motion to
dismiss. However, it is burdensome to require the plaintiff to get
the specific language before commencing the procedure based on
the amended complaint. The trial court may mistakenly fail to use
specific language, and there must be some way to redress such a
situation.
Whether principles of res judicata apply should not depend on
the language used, but on the substantive content of the decision
granting the motion to dismiss. The specific language can be one
factor in determining whether the claim is barred by res judicata.
Certainly, the court may give a judgment a res judicata effect by
giving plaintiff a fair opportunity to get to the merits and by using
specific language. However, the determinative test should be
whether the procedure in the first action meets the requirements
of res judicata, i.e. whether it is claim preclusion or issue
preclusion.
2. Claim Preclusion
According to the general claim preclusion doctrine, claim pre-
clusion must be allowed in a case only when the Rule 12(b)(6) pro-
cedure afforded plaintiff a fair opportunity to get to the merits.
What then is the situation in which plaintiff is given a fair oppor-
tunity to get to the merits when the court rendered a judgment of
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)? 2 7
Dismissals in the A and B contexts are essentially rendered as
a matter of law on the merits, unless the legal question is limited
to presented questions and there may be other legal claims. Since
the court must examine all conceivable legal theories on which re-
lief could be granted on the basis of the alleged facts, the plaintiff
is deemed to be given a fair opportunity to get to the merits. Dis-
missal in the A and B contexts may be viewed as a decision made
because of an entire failure to state a cause of action.428
On the other hand, since the court should not dispose of a
claim on only technical or procedural grounds,42 9 dismissal in the G
427. Decisions denying the motion in the B, F and G contexts will not have a
res judicata effect because it is not a final judgment.
428. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 419, § 4439, at 355.
429. Id. at 361-362.
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context should not have a res judicata effect. If a court dismisses a
complaint for deficiency in form in the G context, the plaintiff is
not given an opportunity to get to the merits. If the court wishes to
generate a res judicata effect, it should treat the complaint on the
merits.4 30
When the issue is the sufficiency of the pleading, the matter is
similar to the G context rather than the A and B context. Just
granting a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
is not a ruling on the merits,431 a ruling under Rule 12(b)(6) for
technical or procedural grounds should not be considered to be on
the merits and its res judicata effect should be limited to issue pre-
clusion. Since the claim is not substantively litigated and
determinated, dismissals in the C, D, or E context should not have
a claim preclusion effect.
In the C context, there should be no claim preclusion because,
on the substantive level, a plaintiff may fail to rely on a reliable
theory by relying on a wrong theory,4 32 while on the procedural
level, plaintiffs may believe that they do not have to allege some
elements under liberal pleading.4 33 In both cases, a dismissal in the
C context may mean the elimination of the suit for only technical
or procedural reasons.
In the D context, when essential elements are stated in mere
conclusory or general fashion, it is likely that the plaintiff cannot
get enough information about the element, or is intentionally ig-
noring it in order to avoid giving an unfavorable impression relat-
ing to the existence of the fact. Some may argue that, in the D
context, the court should give attention to whether a plaintiff can
430. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
431. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931); Wins-
low v. Walters, 815 F.2d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir. 1987) (its res judicata effect is lim-
ited to the question of jurisdiction).
432. See, e.g., In re Longhorn Sec. Litig., 573 F. Supp. 255, 271 (W.D. Okla.
1983) (the court had to determine whether the plaintiffs' fiduciary duty claims
were properly stated on any theory against the defendants who were not general
partners. Although the only conceivable basis for the plaintiffs' claim was a joint
venture theory, the plaintiffs did not state any facts on the theory).
433. See, e.g., Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir.
1989)(affirming a dismissal for failure to state a claim by holding that a stock
holder did not have standing to claim damages based on violation of section
prohibiting use or investment of income from racketeering activity, where the
stock holder failed to allege any facts showing injury from use or investment of
racketeering income because the plaintiff appeared to believed that he did not
have to allege it).
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ordinarily obtain enough information regarding the essential ele-
ment. In other words, the court should not dismiss the claim with
prejudice if it is unlikely that a plaintiff can obtain the informa-
tion. But the court should dismiss the claim with prejudice when a
plaintiff should know the elements. However, as it is difficult to
discern the former case from the latter, and often difficult to dis-
cern whether a lower court intends a res judicata effect, attempting
to distinguish cases on this basis is probably not a worthwhile
endeavor.
In the E context however, it seems to be appropriate for the
courts to give res judicata effect to a 12(b)(6) dismissal. Since
plaintiffs in this context refer to the elements, they apparently
know the necessity of alleging them. When a plaintiff tries to make
a claim on the basis of a highly improbable allegation despite un-
necessary particularized pleading in the E context, there is no rea-
son for courts to allow the plaintiff another opportunity to state
the same claim.
In summary, in a Rule 12(b)(6) proceeding, the court cannot
always examine and determine adequately why the plaintiff failed
to state a claim before the judgment. A plaintiff may very well
have a substantive claim even though his complaint has been dis-
missed for insufficient allegations. Although a plaintiff should al-
lege essential elements on a reliable legal theory, a failure to do so
does not always mean that the element is not proveable or that
another more apt legal theory does not exist. Accordingly, in the C,
D and E contexts, the court should not assume that the plaintiff
cannot state the essential element, even though the court may de-
cide the complaint was defective.
Although some courts recognize claim preclusion,3 4 a Rule
12(b)(6) decision which denies sufficiency of the pleading does not
afford plaintiff a fair opportunity to get to specific merits, and
should not be given claim preclusion effect. Unlike the A and B
contexts, the allegations must be insufficient for there to be a claim
preclusion effect, just as they are insufficient to state a claim in the
434. See, e.g., Hall v. Tower Land & Inv. Co., 512 F.2d 481, 483 (5th Cir.
1975) (stating that the appellate court will not go behind the order to determine
precisely which issues the trial court decided); Teltronics Serv., Inc. v. L.M. Erics-
son Telecommunications Inc., 642 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that a final
judgment is res judicata "not only to all matters pleaded, but to all that might
have been" and "not only as to all matters litigated and decided by it, but as to
all relevant issues which could have been but were not raised and litigated in the
suit.") (quoting Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 735 (1946)).
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C, D and E contexts. Since the allegations did not specify essential
elements of a claim, it is impossible to specify what claim is
barred. Without a clear distinction between the alleged claim and
the claim not alleged, the scope of claim not alleged preclusion
may be unfairly enlarged.
Many authorities have come to reject the distinction between
the entire merits of the claim and the sufficiency of the pleading
which was formerly made.4 5 Today, dismissal for failure to state a
claim generally precludes a second action on an improved pleading.
However, this general rule does not reach all dismissals for inade-
quate pleading.436 In other words, in the C, D and E contexts, dis-
missals for vague or incomprehensible pleading may not justify dis-
missal with claim preclusion. Some may argue that under this rule,
dismissals in these contexts cannot end a dispute involving insuffi-
cient allegations. However, these dismissals have full issue preclu-
sion effect. Also, the amended Rule 11 may effectively sanction
against unreasonable attacks. Opponents of the distinction assert
that very few meritorious claims will be precluded by the non-dis-
tinction rule. 37 However, under the distinction approach, no meri-
torious claim will be precluded, at least theoretically. Since the au-
tomatic application of res judicata should not allow any injustice,
the distinction approach is better than the current non-distinction
rule.
Therefore, dismissal in the C, D, E and G contexts should
have issue preclusion effect but should not have claim preclusion
effect. The court can adequately achieve the objectives of res judi-
cata by issue preclusion in these contexts.
3. Fairness in Rule 12(b)(6) Proceedings
In granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court can avoid unfair-
ness by granting leave to amend, and this is the prevailing prac-
tice.438 When the court denies leave to amend with res judicata ef-
fect the considerations in a Rule 12(b)(6) proceeding should not
involve any reason that would unfairly invoke issue preclusion.
The court should first pay attention to the burden of pleading.3 9
Also, in dismissing sua sponte, the court should follow the strict
435. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 419, § 4439, at 357.
436. Id. at 360-361.
437. Id. at 358.
438. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 11, § 14.7, at 654.
439. See supra part II-E-3.
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procedural rules discussed supra in part III-C.
B. Amendment
If a district court finds the allegations of a complaint to be
insufficient, it may dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)."10 If
a district court has dismissed the complaint, two courses of action
are open to the plaintiff: (1) he may appeal the judgment, or (2) he
may seek leave to amend under Rule 15(a) after having the judg-
ment reopened under either Rule 59 or 60."41 On the other hand, if
the district court overlooks the defective allegations and allows
plaintiff an eVidentiary hearing, the complaint apparently can
avoid re-examination on appeal because, once done, the eviden-
tiary hearing cannot be ignored.442
After a dismissal decision under Rule 12(b)(6), can the plain-
tiff modify and refile the complaint? Generally, a pleading will not
be dismissed for mere insufficiency or informality of a statement of
a claim. Instead, the court ordinarily will give plaintiff leave to file
an amended complaint following a dismissal order.44'  Thus,
amendment of pleading is to be freely granted, even after trial,
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b), and the court is di-
rected in any event to grant the parties whatever relief they are
entitled to after trial, whether they have requested it or not, by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c).
The allowance of an amendment after dismissal lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court.44 ' However, there are circum-
stances where amendment will not be allowed. The court should
deny leave to file a proposed amended complaint if it appears to a
440. Generally, the court will not dismiss a pleading for mere insufficiency or
informality of a statement of claim. Instead, the court should grant leave to
amend unless the complaint is incurably defective. 4 CEPLA & PALMER, supra note
4, § 14.154, at 238.
441. Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1111 (7th Cir. 1984).
442. See, e.g., Lasercorp America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 980 (4th
Cir. 1990) ("When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or im-
plied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had
been raised in the pleadings"). Cf. Roberts, supra note 9, at 414.
443. See, e.g., Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Auth., 941 F.2d 119, 123 (2d
Cir. 1991).
444. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a). See, e.g., Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, (1962);
Miller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 982 (6th Cir. 1991) ("[W]e
review those decisions under an abuse of discretion standard.") (citing Martin v.
Associated Truck Lines, Inc., 801 F.2d 246, 248); 3 MOORE & LUCAS, supra note
422, 15.10, at 15-106.
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certainty that plaintiff cannot state a claim.445 Accordingly, if the
court indicates that no curative amendment is possible, it will not
allow further amendments after a motion to dismiss has been
granted.4" Even when leave to admend is granted, failure by the
plaintiff to respond or an insufficient amendment can trigger dis-
missal of a complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6)." 7
Many courts and commentators have suggested several factors
to be considered regarding the exercise of the court's discretion to
grant leave to amend.44' The categorization of Rule 12(b)(6) deci-
sions provides an additional factor to be considered concerning
leave to amend. For instance, when a dismissal is without
prejudice, leave to amend is not automatically granted. 44 9 However,
a dismissal with prejudice need not give further opportunity to ar-
gue the same claim because the court has already given a fair con-
sideration to the merits. Under the categories explored supra, dis-
missal in the A and B contexts will tend not to allow amendment
because the decision was on the merits.5 ° On the other hand, dis-
445. See, e.g., Ricciuti, 941 F.2d at 123; Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 948
F.2d 1037, 1041 (6th Cir. 1991) (an amendment may not be allowed if the com-
plaint as amended could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion); Cook, Perkiss &
Liehe v. Northern California Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir.
1990); see also, 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1357, at 360-67; 4 CEPLA &
PALMER, supra note 4, § 14.154, at 238.
446. SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 2, § 50, at 200.
447. See, e.g., Fidelity Fin. Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 792 F.2d 1432,
1438 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1064, 107 (1987) (stating that the dis-
trict court's discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plain-
tiff has previously amended the complaint); Levitch v. CBS, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 292
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (defendants entitled to dismissal with prejudice because the
plaintiff's amendment to the first amended complaint neither met the pleading
requirement of the Federal Rules nor constituted "amended pleading" as required
by the prior order).
448. See, e.g., Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160
(9th Cir. 1989) (The Ascon court pointed out five factors to consider: (1) bad
faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of amend-
ment, (5) whether plaintiff has previously amended his complaint. Id. (citing
DCD Program, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186-87 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987)). See
also SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 2, § 53, at 208-210.
449. The Second Circuit for example has clearly rejected the view that "with-
out prejudice, means "with leave to amend." Elfenbein v. Gulf & Western Indus.,
Inc., 590 F.2d 445, 448 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating that "without prejudice" and "with
prejudice" are not substitutes for clear indications as to whether repleading will
be allowed).
450. 3 MOORE, supra note 422, 15.11, at 15-109. ("When the pleader has
stood upon his pleading and appealed from a judgment of dismissal, amendment
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missal in the C, D, E, and G contexts should be amenable to allow
amendment subject to Rule 15 requirements, because the decision
does not have a res judicata effect, and does bind the parties.
Some technical problems arise with regard to the amendment
of the complaint following a successful motion under Rule
12(b)(6).45' For example, should the court deny the motion to dis-
miss for repleading or grant the motion to dismiss with leave to
amend the complaint? Can the plaintiff amend once as a matter of
right if no responsive pleading has been served? Must he obtain
the court's permission for any amendment when the dismissal or-
der does not expressly grant leave to replead, or expressly negates
any right to amend?452 If plaintiff opts to amend, is he deemed to
waive his argument that the original complaint was sufficient? 53
Each question will be dealt with in turn.
1. Dismissal withLeave to Amend
When a complaint is insufficient but suggestive of a claim, it is
not clear whether the court should deny the motion to dismiss for
repleading454 or grant the motion to dismiss with leave to amend
the complaint.45 5 There may be no difference between the two
will not normally be permitted . . .if the order of dismissal is affirmed."). This
proposition should be applied only to the dismissal in the A and B contexts.
451. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1357, at 372.
452. Id.
453. Both state and federal courts are divided on this question. SHREVE &
RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 2, § 50, at 201.
454. See Festa v. Local 3 Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, 905 F.2d 35, 37
(2d Cir. 1990) (reversing a dismissal of the complaint against the labor union be-
cause nothing on the face of the complaint indicated that the plaintiff could not
adequately replead a claim against the union); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't,
901 F.2d 696, 700-02 (9th Cir. 1990) (reversing the dismissal with prejudice of
plaintiff's equal protection claim because the plaintiff was entitled to amend the
complaint to clarify claim that police officers violated equal protection); Scott v.
Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 1975) (reversing the dismissal of
plaintiff's count insofar as it denied leave to amend because the court could con-
ceive of facts that would render plaintiff's claim viable and discern from the rec-
ord no reason why leave to amend should be denied).
455. See Jackson v. City of Beaumont Police Dep't, 958 F.2d 616, 622 (5th
Cir. 1992) (reversing the district court's denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and
instructing to replead further in accordance with heightened pleading require-
ment under § 1983); Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 957 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir.
1992) (after affirming the dismissal of a complaint, the Ninth Circuit questioned
whether it should remand to permit the plaintiff to amend her pleadings); Bra-
num v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that dismissal of complaint
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courses, because the plaintiff can replead his claim in either case.
Accordingly, it may be good for the court to have some discretion
to deny or grant the motion with leave to amend the complaint in
this context. However, a district court's discretion to dismiss the
complaint without leave to amend should be severely restricted by
Rule 15(a).458 Also, denying the motion might be favorable in view
of a statue of limitations and appealability.45 7
2. Right to Amend
It is well-settled that cases should be decided on their merits,
and that the plaintiff should be given a reasonable opportunity to
cure the formal defects of the complaint. For this reason, some
courts have held that upon dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the
plaintiff may amend the complaint as a matter of right under Rule
15(a) if there has been no responsive pleading. However, others re-
quire the plaintiff to obtain leave to amend.
For example, the Seventh Circuit held that when the original
complaint is dismissed, the litigation has not been terminated and
the plaintiff still retains his right to amend once as a matter of
course under Rule 15(a).458 In this regard, the courts appear to dis-
tinguish dismissal of the complaint from dismissal of the action
and to read Rule 15(a) literally to allow a plaintiff to amend once
after dismissal of the complaint. 59 On the other hand, the First
Circuit has held that the thrust of Rule 15(a) is aimed at the pre-
judgment phases of litigation, and that plaintiffs were not entitled
to amend their complaint even though no responsive pleading had
been served.4 0 Also, the Second Circuit held that the right to
amend without permission terminates unless the court explicitly
under Rule 12(b)(6) should ordinarily be accompanied by leave to file amended
complaint); Elliott v. Bronson, 872 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming the dismissal
but remanding and directing the leave to amend); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d
40, 43 (2d Cir. 1988).
456. See, e.g., Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991), citing
Thomas v. Town of Davie, 847 F.2d 771, 773 (11th Cir. 1988).
457. See supra part III-D; infra part IV-C.
458. Peterson Steels, Inc. v. Seidmon, 188 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1951).
459. Accordingly, that right does not survive a dismissal of the entire action.
See, e.g., Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984).
460. See, e.g., The Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 22-
23 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[Lleave to amend will be granted sparingly and only if justice
requires further proceedings").
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grants leave to amend in ruling on the motion,461 because efficient
judicial administration is lost after the court has already ruled by
granting a motion to dismiss.8 2
Some commentators argue that the better practice is to allow
at least one amendment regardless of how unpromising the initial
pleading appears.463 Since the better rule is to limit the courts' dis-
cretion concerning technical matters, a plaintiff should be allowed
his right to amend once as a matter of course. After one amend-
ment has been allowed, the district court has "discretion whether
or not to grant leave to amend, and its discretion is not subject to
review on appeal except for abuse of discretion. ' 46 4 Otherwise, the
effect of granting dismissal may be especially harsh for a plaintiff.
After a plaintiff has exercised the right to amend a complaint, the
court will have discretion whether to grant leave to amend under
Rule 15(a).
3. Question of Waiver
If a plaintiff chooses to amend without arguing that the origi-
nal complaint was sufficient, he may lose the opportunity to argue
it.4"' Some commentators maintain that under the Federal Rules a
plaintiff waives his objection to the court's dismissal order only in-
sofar as it applies to technical defects in the original complaint, if
the plaintiff asks leave to amend his complaint and the amend-
ment is merely a technical one, most courts will not allow the
plaintiff to argue on appeal that the dismissal of his earlier plead-
ing was erroneous. However, a plaintiff may still argue on appeal
from an unfavorable final judgment after a trial on the merits of
the amended complaint, that the erroneous grant of the Rule
12(b)(6) motion against his original complaint struck a vital blow
461. Although the other position basically requires leave to amend, some
commentators view some circuits as taking an intermediate position that plaintiff
may amend with leave of court after dismissal, unless the court either holds that
no amendment is possible or that dismissal of the complaint also constitutes dis-
missal of the action. SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 2, 53, at 209.
462. Elfenbein v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 590 F.2d 445, 448 n.1 (2d Cir.
1978).
463. See, e.g., 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1357, at 365-367.
464. 3 MOORE, supra note 422, 15.08, at 15-64.
465. See, e.g., Leggett v. Montgomery Word & Co., 178 F.2d 436 (10th Cir.
1949) (overruled by Davis v. TXO Prod. Corp., 929 F.2d 1515 (10th Cir. 1991);
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.25, at 302.
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to a substantial portion of his case.46 In this regard, since the
court may dismiss a claim for technical defects in the C, D, E and
G contexts, the plaintiff is deemed to have waived his argument.
On the other hand, the plaintiff may argue on appeal that the com-
plaint sufficiently stated a claim in the A and B contexts.
C. Appealability
Generally, when the court grants the motion to dismiss, the
plaintiff may appeal because the decision is final on the merits.
46" 7
When the court denies the motion, neither party can appeal, unless
the jurisdiction permits interlocutory appeals, because there is no
final judgment from which to take an appeal.4"
Similarly, an order dismissing a complaint with leave to
amend is normally interlocutory and not appealable,'69 because the
deficiency may be corrected by the plaintiff without affecting the
cause of action.410 Since it is not clear whether the court denies the
motion to dismiss for repleading or grants the motion to dismiss
with leave to amend the complaint, there should not be a substan-
tial difference between them, and both decisions are not appeala-
ble. Also, it may be good for the court to have some discretion to
deny or grant the motion.
However, just as the complaint should be tested in order to
facilitate appellate review in the B context, the dismissal decision
should also be reviewed at an early stage, if the plaintiff desires. In
some jurisdictions, if the plaintiff cannot amend or declares his in-
tention to stand on his complaint, the order does become final and
appealable. 47'1 Also, if the court does not want an appeal, denying
the motion for repleading might be simpler. However, plaintiff may
466. 6 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d,
§ 1476, at 560-61 (2d. ed. 1990); SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 2, § 50, at
201. See, e.g., Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1238 (5th Cir.
1978) (citing Blazer v. Black, 196 F.2d 139, 143-44 (10th Cir. 1952)).
467. See, e.g., 2A MOORE, supra note 422, 12.14, at 12-103.
468. See, e.g., SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 2, § 50, at 201; Goetz v.
Calppelen, 946 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 1991).
469. See, e.g., Kozemchak v. Ukrainian Orthodox Church of America, 443
F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
470. Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d Cir. 1976).
471. See, e.g., DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 822 F.2d 1242,
1247 (2d Cir. 1987); Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir.
1976); Azar v. Conley, 480 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1973); Grantham v. McGraw-Edison
Co., 444 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1971); Hurst v. California, 451 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1971).
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be deemed to have irrevocably waived the option to further amend
the complaint.4
72
V. CONCLUSION
Under modern pleading, Rule 12(b)(6) will not serve the func-
tions of issue narrowing, fact development and guidance, and full
screening of sham or insufficient claims or defenses. Rule 12(b)(6)
may, however, serve the functions of important issue identification
and some screening of unmeritorious or insufficient claims or de-
fenses. The function of Rule 12(b)(6) can be the disposition of cer-
tain cases as follows:
i) those which state no legal theory whatsoever, including friv-
olous cases (A context);
ii) those which state no legal ground to establish a claim
(B context);
iii) those which contain no factual allegation of an essential ele-
ment of established legal theory (C context);
iv) those which state only conclusory, general allegations with-
out any description of the basic nature of the dispute
(D context); or
v) those containing highly improbable allegations of an essen-
tial element of established legal theory (E context).
This function may also eliminate some marginal claims and
parties. In an unusual case, a complaint which is defective in form
(G context) may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) as well as Rule
12(f). On the other hand, the court can tentatively confirm the va-
lidity of a claim (B context), or the sufficiency of allegations of a
conceivable set of facts alleged in support of essential elements es-
tablishing legal grounds (F context).
Needless to say, Rule 12(b)(6) has many sub-functions, which
were referred to in part I-A of this article. Although Rule 12(b)(6)
motions may signal the defendant's determination to litigate, or
affect settlement dynamics, these are merely by-products. The
functions of Rule 12(b)(6), including issue identification and
screening of unmeritorious or insufficient claims or defenses, must
be finally accomplished through discovery, pretrial conference,
other screening motions, and other devices. Courts should exercise
discretion regarding application of Rule 12(b)(6) or dismissal sua
472. See, e.g., DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 822 F.2d 1242,
1247 (2d Cir. 1987).
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sponte under some clear standards. The desirable standards for
Rule 12(b)(6) may be double or plural standards, depending on the
issues on the face of the complaint. However, the standards should
not vary upon whether the action is "disfavored" or not. Plural
standards should be drawn from the objectives and effects of Rule
12(b)(6) proceedings. When the court must decide whether the
plaintiff has legal grounds or not (A and B contexts), the Conley
standard should not be applied. On the other hand, when the court
decides whether the complaint sufficiently states allegations, the
Conley standard should be fully applied. The real problem is not
one of sufficiency or specificity of allegations, but rather concerns
regarding the statement of essential elements, the burden of plead-
ing, or the burden of the movant. Only when the movant success-
fully shows that the complaint has only conclusory, general, or
highly improbable allegations of an essential element of estab-
lished legal theory may the court grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Additionally, dismissal sua sponte should be used subject to the
strict procedural rules only in cases where the claim is not sup-
ported by any legal ground (A context), or factual allegation of an
essential element is absent (C context). Finally, when the court de-
cides the complaint is defective in form, the court should use Rule
12(b)(6) very sparingly (G context).
All dismissals have an issue preclusion effect. However, while
dismissals in the A and B contexts should have a claim preclusion
effect, dismissals in the C, D, E and G contexts should not. Accord-
ingly, the court may use dismissal sua sponte with full res judicata
effect only in the A context, which will rarely occur. In ordinary
cases, the court will have to consider claims in other contexts. As a
result, although the court may be able to dispose of fewer cases,
each case may be treated more fairly by using Rule 12(b)(6).
Although it may be desirable to codify such standards in the
Rules, the courts may have already used such standards to some
extent. Without clarifying the standards, Rule 12(b)(6) will remain
an obscure, flexible procedure which is easily manipulated by law-
yers, and which will impede the justice the Federal Rules originally
sought. However, if Rule 12(b)(6) is utilized in an appropriate
manner and under relatively clear standards, it can appropriately
influence settlement dynamics. Thus, as with so many other areas
of the law, the future of Rule 12(b)(6) depends on the development
of clear standards.
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